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Abstract 
 
In this study, we explore the impact of mandatory adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the prices lead earnings relation. More specifically, we 
investigate whether the change in accounting environment underlying the mandatory IFRS 
adoption in 2005, which aims to improve the financial information provided by firms to the 
market, has impact on how stock returns are able to explain future earnings change. 
Using a sample of 16,755 firm-year observations from 16 European countries during 
the 1999 to 2011 period, we find evidence that stock returns of European firms are able to 
anticipate future earnings changes. However, following mandatory IFRS adoption, the stock 
returns exhibit a significant reduction in their predictive power about future earnings 
changes, which is not explained by country-level characteristics. 
 We also find that this negative impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the prices 
lead earnings relation is more pronounced in countries where the level of shareholders 
protection and legal enforcement is low. Furthermore, we provide some evidence that this 
negative impact increases as the average size of firms increase. 
This study is relevant and pertinent, since it contributes to the literature concerning 
(i) the ability of prices to price financial information and (ii) the implications of mandatory 
IFRS adoption, when almost 120 countries have already been using these standards and 
other great world economies have the intention to adopt them. 
 
Key-words: Stock returns, Expected earnings, IFRS, Europe. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Ball and Brown (1968) were the first to analyze the relation between prices and 
financial statements information. The seminal publication of Ball and Brown (1968) jointly 
with Bernard and Thomas (1989) are the basis of the known anomaly of the post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD). This anomaly states that the market reacts positively 
(negatively) to positive (negative) earnings announcements suggesting that the information 
contained in accounting earnings is useful in setting prices. Returns continue to drift upward 
or downward, according to the sign of earnings change in large part over the first three 
months after earnings management and therefore the returns are predictable after the 
disclosure of earnings information. In turn, Liu et al. (2003) provide evidence that PEAD 
phenomenon exists not only in U.S. market but also in U.K. market, regardless of the 
measure of earnings surprise used. However, current research draws attention to the impact 
that transaction costs can have either in the significance of PEAD phenomenon and its 
profitability (Ng et al. 2008, Chordia et al. 2009).  
Another perspective arises primarily with the publication of Beaver et al. (1980), 
which inverts the contemporaneous relationship between earnings and returns previously 
analyzed by Ball and Brown (1968). In their paper, Beaver et al. (1980) understand the 
beliefs of markets participants regarding to future earnings through the analysis of price 
changes. In a simple way, stock returns contain information about future earnings growth. 
Behind this is the idea that the information set reflected in prices is richer than in 
contemporaneous accounting earnings (Kothari 2001) – prices, instead of earnings, 
immediately incorporate the net present value of new investments made by the company. 
Therefore, price changes may be useful to anticipate future earnings changes. Noted that this 
point of view assumes the market is efficient, that is, "security prices fully reflect all 
available information" (Fama 1991, p.1575). 
Freeman (1987) and Collins et al. (1987) incorporate the firm size variable in the 
previous findings. Both studies find that prices of large firms anticipate the future earnings 
changes earlier than prices of small firms. Under a different scope of research, Hussainey et 
al. (2003) suggest that prices of firms associated with higher annual report disclosures 
exhibit greater predictive power about future earnings. In turn, Sadka and Sadka (2009) 
study the implications of the predictability of earnings growth through the stock prices for 
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both individual and aggregate firms and find that prices better anticipate earnings growth at 
the aggregate level than at the firm level. 
Over the last 10 years academic researchers have increasingly focused on the effect 
of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
worldwide. In 2005, the European Union required the application of IFRS for listed 
companies with the goal of harmonizing the several national accounting systems across 
Europe. 
Some academic researchers suggest that following the adoption of IFRS firms 
experience an improvement in transparency (Wang et al. 2008, Barth et al. 2008, Armstrong 
et al. 2010, Houqe et al. 2014) and in comparability (Brochet et al. 2013) while others find 
little or no evidence of improved transparency (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2005, Hung and 
Subramanyam 2007, Kaserer and Klingler 2008, Paananen and Lin 2009, Callao and Jarne 
2010, Zeghal et al. 2012, Preiato et al. 2015) and comparability (Lang et al. 2010). 
Regarding the cost of capital, market liquidity and cross-border investment, the literature 
seems to be consistent in showing at least some improvements on these indicators after 
mandatory IFRS adoption (Daske et al. 2008, Yu 2010, Li 2010, DeFond et al. 2011, Daske 
et al. 2013, Christensen et al. 2013, Shibly and Dumontier 2014).  
This study aims to understand the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption in the 
earnings-returns relation in European Union. First, the earnings-returns relation has been 
studied and confirmed mainly under U.S. firms and therefore it is not clear whether this 
relation persist in European firms. Second, firms in approximately 120 countries, currently 
prepare their financial statements following IFRS. However, some of the major capital 
markets do not required the IFRS adoption to date and it is unclear when they will require (if 
require) in future. In the United States, the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) 
proposed in 2008 a “roadmap” for the mandatory adoption of IFRS by U.S. companies as 
soon as 2014. However, the financial crisis changed the priorities of SEC and the decision to 
adopt IFRS in U.S. cooled. More recently, in the Strategic plan for 2015-2018, the SEC 
refers that will consider "whether a single set of high-quality global accounting standards is 
achievable" (Draft SEC Strategic Plan for 2014-2018, p. 8), not excluding a possible IFRS 
adoption by U.S. firms in the future. In addition, in Japan the voluntary IFRS adoption is 
allowed but no mandatory transition date has been established; India has intention to adopt 
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between 2016 to 2017 and, finally, China intends to fully converge with IFRS but it has not 
defined transition date (PWC, October 2014). 
This study intends to explore (1) if stock returns of European firms are able to 
anticipate future earnings changes; (2) if mandatory IFRS adoption strengthens the share 
price anticipation of future earnings changes and (3) whether the impact of IFRS adoption 
differs for the 16 European countries analyzed and across firms. We test these hypotheses on 
a sample of 16,755 firm-year observations from 16 European countries between 1999 and 
2011. 
Our main findings are as follows. We find that stock returns of European firms are 
able to anticipate future earnings changes, which is consistent with U.S. findings. Moreover, 
this predictive power is stronger for profit firms than for loss firms, which is consistent with 
higher informativeness of profit firms about future cash-flow evidenced in Hayn (1995). 
However, following IFRS adoption the stock returns exhibit a significant reduction in the 
ability to anticipate future earnings changes. We find that this negative effect is not driven 
by country-level characteristics. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that the negative impact of IFRS adoption on the 
prices lead earnings relation is more pronounced in countries based on French legal origin, 
which in turn is associated to countries with low shareholders protection and low level of 
legal enforcement (La Porta et al. 1998). Finally, we provide some evidence that this 
significant reduction increases as the average size of firms increase. 
The remainder of the report is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior related 
literature and our research questions are discussed in section 3. In section 4, we present our 
empirical methodology, sample and data sources. Section 5 presents the results of the main 
regressions while the section 6 reports the results of sensitivity analysis. Finally, we 
conclude the study in section 7. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this section two areas of research are related: earnings-returns relation and IFRS 
adoption. The earnings-returns relation has been subject to extensive research by financial 
accounting researchers and there are two perspectives. The first was initiated with the study 
of Ball and Brown (1968) – post earnings announcement drift – while the second was 
initially advanced in the study of Beaver et al. (1980) – prices lead earnings. Regarding to 
IFRS adoption, it will approach the benefits and/or costs underlying the mandatory IFRS 
adoption by European listed firms in 2005. 
Therefore, the state of art of these two areas of research will be approached in the 
next points. 
 
2.1. Earnings predict returns 
 
The study of Ball and Brown (1968) is one of the most important in the financial 
accounting literature. They explore whether accounting income numbers convey information 
about the firms’ financial performance. Assuming that the market is efficient and therefore 
new information is incorporated in the prices instantaneously, changes in the stock returns 
are able to mirror the market’s beliefs regarding new information. So, as the prices change 
with the disclosure of earnings reports, it is possible to assume that the information 
underlying the accounting income numbers is useful. To assess the change they used the 
𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑀  technique which represents the abnormal performance index of month M. The results 
demonstrate that after the disclosure of annual reports, API drifts up or down, according to 
the sign of earnings news (positive or negative) over the months following the earnings 
announcement. Therefore, information contained in the annual accounting income number is 
useful and allows market participants to predict abnormal returns. However, Ball and Brown 
(1968) noted that most of this information is already been perceived by market participants 
before the annual report is disclosed - almost 12 months preceding the report. 
In line with the previous study, Bernard and Thomas (1989) provide evidence that 
over 60 trading days after the disclosure of accounting income number, combining a long 
(short) position in the portfolio with the highest (lowest) unexpected yields approximately 
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6.31% in abnormal returns – post earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Notice that the 
portfolios were constructed by NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) and AMEX (American 
Stock Exchange) firms for the period 1974-1986. They investigate whether the abnormal 
returns after earnings announcement can be explained by one of two factors: (1) an 
incomplete adjustment for risk or (2) a delayed price response.  
Regarding the first possible explanation, Bernard and Thomas (1989) allows betas 
to shift around the time across standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and find that betas 
increase (decrease) for firms with high (low) standardized unexpected earnings. However, 
according to the authors, these risk changes are not enough to fully explain the magnitude of 
the drift. Regarding the explanation based on a delayed price response to earnings reports, 
Bernard and Thomas (1989) suggest that abnormal returns can be the result of the inability 
of market participants to revise their expectations based on new information or because the 
immediate exploitation of information conducts to transaction costs or opportunity costs 
which exceeds the potential gains. They argue the delay in price response is consistent with 
their results but, nevertheless, it leaves some questions to be answered, in particular, why 
market participants act as irrational agents when earnings information is available, as it can 
be predicted based on earnings from the previous period. Finally, they also provide evidence 
that the magnitude of the drift is negatively related to the firm size and, regarding to length 
of time, a large amount of the drift occurs in the first 60 days following the announcement of 
earnings. However, within this time interval, the majority of the drift takes place in the first 
five days. 
Bernard and Thomas (1989) provide their results using U.S. data like other studies 
in the literature that focus on this anomaly of the market. In turn, Liu et al. (2003) explore 
whether this anomaly is also present in U.K. stock market. They conduct an extensive study 
in one of the most important markets outside the U.S. in order to add insights into the PEAD 
phenomenon. They use a sample of 835 stocks and 13.848 half-yearly earnings, 
corresponding a sample period from 1988 to 1998. To test the presence of PEAD in U.K. 
market, they use a set of earnings surprise measures based on the time-series of earnings, 
market prices and analyst forecasts. They find that, regardless of the measure of earnings 
surprise used, there is evidence of PEAD in U.K. market, as in U.S. market. In particular, 
the measure of earnings surprise based on market prices provides the strongest drift effect. 
Consequently, the authors suggest that, as there is evidence of PEAD anomaly in both U.S. 
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and U.K. market, the market is not efficient and therefore this study is a further contribution 
to the rejection of hypotheses of market efficiency. 
Kothari et al. (2006) decided to investigate whether the irrational behaviour by 
market participants when accounting earnings are disclosed, as previously mentioned 
(Bernard and Thomas 1989), remains at the aggregate level. Put differently, they study the 
reaction of market participants to quarterly earnings news. For this purpose they used all 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated) firms 
for the years 1970 to 2000. Unlike what is demonstrated at the firm level, at aggregate level, 
the aggregate returns are not related to aggregate earnings news, suggesting that there is no 
evidence of post earnings announcement drift at the aggregate level. 
A considerable part of the literature on this topic focuses on the impact of 
transaction costs on this market anomaly. Bernard and Thomas (1989), as mentioned above, 
see transaction costs as a possible explanation for the drift. Ng et al. (2008) also study how 
transaction costs can explain the presence of PEAD. They hypothesize that market reaction 
to earnings announcement is weaker- and the drift in returns is larger- for firms whose 
shares have higher transaction costs. Using a sample composed of NYSE and AMEX firms, 
for the period 1988 to 2005, they provide evidence that support their hypothesis. 
Furthermore, they construct portfolios in order to exploit the PEAD trading strategy and 
they find that profits obtained using that strategy are significantly reduced by transaction 
costs. In particular, extreme decile portfolios yields annual size-adjusted returns of 11.92% 
but when it is taken into account transaction costs, the new return is only 3.36%. 
Chordia et al. (2009) also revise this market anomaly incorporating transaction 
costs with the objective to test whether this trading strategy is truly profitable. In 
particularly, they measure the impact of illiquidity on PEAD. The authors use NYSE and 
AMEX’s firms for the period 1972 to 2005. It is generally accepted that liquidity stocks are 
the ones that market participants can trade faster and in larger quantities resulting in faster 
incorporation of information on market prices. They compute the returns following the 
implementation of a long-short strategy, that is, buy (sell) the stocks of firms with good 
(bad) earnings. Using this strategy, the value-weighted returns for liquid and illiquid stocks 
are 0.04% and 2.43%, respectively. However, the illiquid stocks are the ones with higher 
transaction costs and they find that transaction costs correspond to 70-100 percent of the 
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potential profits through this strategy. In short, they conclude that transaction costs make it 
impossible to explore such anomaly profitably. 
In sum, the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is the event when the market 
returns react in same direction than accounting earnings surprises following earnings 
announcement (Ball and Brown 1968, Bernard and Thomas 1989). However, some current 
research argue that previous research undervalued the impact of transaction costs either in 
the explanation of PEAD phenomenon and in strategy’s implementation (Ng et al. 2008, 
Chordia et al. 2009). Although it has been a long time since the study of Ball and Brown 
(1968), the PEAD phenomenon has been studied by many academic researchers and remains 
robust to the different research approaches used. 
 
2.2. Prices lead earnings 
 
The second perspective of earnings-returns relation was initially advanced in the 
study of Beaver et al. (1980). They develop a new vision of contemporaneous relationship 
between price and earnings, where the direction of the relation was reversed.  
Previously, the earnings market's expectations were based on historical time series 
of earnings. In turn, Beaver et al. (1980) explore whether the joint outcome of past time 
series of earnings with past prices has greater explanatory power about future earnings on 
the premise that prices (prices changes) are good mirror of markets participants’ beliefs. 
They use a sample of CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) firms for the period 
1958-1976 and find evidence that support their hypothesis, that is, the earnings predictability 
is more accurate when models include price data. Thus, the information set reflected in 
prices is richer than in contemporaneous accounting earnings (Kothari 2001). For instance, 
when an airline company is prevented from making flights, that is, to provide the transport 
service by which it generates its earnings due to the eruption of a volcano, the effect of the 
ban and consequently the impact on the earnings of airline company will only be known 
after the release of the interim or annual reports and therefore the accounting earnings 
incorporate this information on prices with a lag. However, in an efficient market, the share 
price of the company incorporates instantaneously the revision of expectations of future cash 
flows of the company by market participants. By this reason, the returns anticipate earnings, 
that is, "prices lead earnings".  
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In line with the previous studies, Kothari and Sloan (1992) also stated that prices 
are able to reflect markets’ beliefs quicker than accounting income numbers and therefore 
the prices are richer than historical earnings. They explore whether there is a positive 
relation between the inclusion of leading-period return and the average earnings response 
coefficient, that is, they examine whether the current earnings changes are explained by 
returns measured up to two or three years ago. Therefore, if prices do not anticipate the 
earnings changes, the impact of inclusion of leading-period return in coefficient will be zero. 
The sample is composed by CRSP's firms for the period 1950-1988
1
. As hypothesized, they 
provide evidence that returns measured during three leading years convey information about 
annual change in earnings.  
In a well-known paper, Basu (1997) uses the findings of previous studies to explore 
the effect of the conservatism principle on financial statements. Conservatism in accounting 
is defined in this study as the "more timely recognition in earnings of bad news regarding 
future cash flows than good news" (Basu 1997, p.33). In order to test this difference into 
news recognition, and basing in the perspective that prices incorporate information beyond 
the historical accounting earnings (in short, prices lead earnings), Basu (1997) uses positive 
(negative) annual stock returns to proxy good (bad) news. Because bad news are recognized 
earlier than good news in the financial statements, it is expected that earnings are more 
sensitive to negative unexpected returns than positive unexpected returns. The author uses 
NYSE and AMEX firms during the period 1963-1990 and the results suggests that the 
sensitivity of earnings to negative returns is two to six times higher than the sensitivity of 
earnings to positive returns, supporting its definition of conservatism. 
Other academic have focused on the relationship between the variable firm size and 
the perspective price lead earnings. The studies of Freeman (1987) and Collins et al. (1987) 
are examples of this matter, being complementary to each other. Freeman (1987) uses a 
sample period between 1966 and 1982, dividing NYSE’s firms into quartiles, where the top 
quartile contains the larger firms (average market value of $2.8bn) and the bottom quartile 
contains the smaller firms (average market value of $46m). The author provides evidence 
that price of NYSE’s large firms are able to reflect the markets’ expectations about future 
earnings in a faster way than prices of NYSE’s small firms. In turn, Collins et al. (1987) use 
                                               
1 Earnings data for 1979-1988 from quarterly tape for earnings measurement intervals shorter than 
one year and data for 1950-1988 from annual tapes when the earnings measurement interval is one year or 
longer. 
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a sample of CRSP firms for the period 1968-1980 and divided the sample by size quintiles 
which are recalculated each year. These authors find that prices of large firms convey more 
information about the future earnings changes than small firms, beyond the information 
gathered from historical earnings. Collins et al. (1987) explain their findings with the 
combined effect of broader information around the large firms and higher number of 
financial analysts to disseminate such information, which enriches the information conveyed 
in prices of large firms. 
Ayers and Freeman (2000) extend prior studies of Freeman (1987) and Collins et al. 
(1987). In addition to a positive relation between firm size and prices lead earnings, there are 
also empirical works which support that stock prices better reflect earnings of wide industry 
than firm-specific earnings. Joining these two topics, Ayers and Freeman (2000) explore 
whether security prices of large firms anticipate industry-wide earnings information earlier 
than security prices of small firms. In order to test the relation between annual returns and 
annual earnings changes, they use firms from Compustat and CRSP for the period between 
1981 and 1996. Based on these results, the average industry coefficients are 2.1 and 0.81 for 
large and small firms, respectively, which provide evidence that stock prices of large firms 
incorporate industry earnings information before smaller firms. 
In the study of Ayers and Freeman (2003), they explore whether the stock prices of 
companies that are more often subject to tight analysis by market professionals (financial 
analysts and institutional investors) anticipate earnings changes earlier than firms which are 
beyond of this spotlight. Thus, they assume that market professionals have higher ability to 
forecast than individual investors. In order to conduct their study, they use a sample 
composed by NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms for the period from 1981 to 1996. As 
hypothesized, they provide evidence that share prices of firms which are subject to scrutiny 
of more market professionals reflect the future earnings changes in a faster way than others. 
More recently, Sadka and Sadka (2009) focus on the earnings-returns relations 
using a sample composed by all firms in CRSP during the period 1965-2000. They study the 
relation between earnings and returns under two views, namely, contemporaneous earnings-
returns relation and predictability on the earnings-returns relation. The first view is based on 
the findings of Ball and Brown (1968) which state that market reacts to the earnings news in 
the same direction. In turn, the second view is based on prices lead earnings relation 
suggested by Beaver et al. (1980). To test the contemporaneous earnings-returns relation and 
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earnings predictability they run specific regressions for each of them, both for the aggregate 
as well as individual firms. At firm-level, the slope coefficient of regression to test 
contemporaneous earnings-returns relation is positive, suggesting that earnings changes 
convey information about markets’ beliefs. The slope coefficient of regression to test 
predictability is also positive. However, the explanatory power is not very high which means 
that prices changes do not fully explain the earnings changes. At aggregate level, while the 
slope coefficient of regression to test contemporaneous earnings-returns relation is negative, 
in the case of predictability, the slope coefficient is positive and statistically significant. 
Therefore, they demonstrate that prices better predict earnings growth at the aggregate level 
than at the firm level. 
 Finally, Hussainey et al. (2003) focus on a different scope of research but that 
suggest interesting results. The authors produce a measure of disclosure quality on annual 
report by counting (1) key words that are associated with future-oriented statements in the 
annual report discussion section and (2) the number of sentences by firm that contain a 
relevant topic. Thus, the authors explore whether the quality of disclosure in the annual 
report discussions section affects the strength of prices lead earnings relation. Hussainey et 
al. (2003) use annual reports available on Dialog database for the years 1996 to 1999 and, as 
predicted, the results suggest that stock prices of firms with higher (lower) level of annual 
report disclosures anticipate the future earnings changes earlier (later). Subsequently, other 
studies have emerged using the same methodology. Schleicher et al. (2007), using U.K. 
annual reports available on Dialog database for the period 1996-2002, provide evidence that 
the relationship between annual report narrative and share price anticipation of earnings is 
not the same for profit and loss firms. The authors find that stock returns of profit firms 
exhibit higher ability to anticipate future earnings changes than loss firms. However, they 
also suggest that high disclosure loss firms exhibit higher ability to anticipate future earnings 
changes than low disclosure loss firms, that is, there is an incremental effect of disclosure on 
share price anticipation of earnings for loss firms. 
 Overall, the research seems to be consistent in showing that the information set in 
stock prices are richer than that in accounting earnings (Kothari 2001). Freeman (1987) and 
Collins et al. (1987) provide evidence that there is a positive relation between firm size 
variable and price lead earnings. In turn, Ayers and Freeman (2003) find that stock prices of 
firms with higher (lower) scrutiny by market professionals reflect more (less) quickly future 
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earnings changes. Furthermore, Sadka and Sadka (2009) suggest that prices better predict 
earnings changes at aggregate level than at firm level and Hussainey et al. (2003), using a 
different scope of research, provide evidence that prices of firms associated to higher annual 
report disclosures exhibit greater predictive power about future earnings. 
Finally, it should be noted that most studies about this stream of literature are based 
on firms from the United States or the United Kingdom (such as those discussed above) and, 
therefore, it is not clear that the price lead earnings relation persists in Europe.  
 
2.3. Mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 
 
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) over the past 
years has been subject to the spotlights throughout the world. Approximately 120 nations 
and reporting jurisdictions require or allow the use of IFRS for domestic listed companies, 
although only almost 90 countries adopt IFRS in full compliance with those promulgated by 
the IASB
2
 (AICPA
3
, 2015). In 2005, the European Union requires listed companies to 
prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS.  
According to the European Commission, the mandatory adoption of IFRS will 
"ensure the high level of transparency and comparability of financial reporting from all 
publicly traded Community companies which is a necessary condition for building an 
integrated capital market which operates effectively, smoothly and efficiently" (EC 
Regulation Nº 1606/2002). 
However, the European Union's effort to harmonize the several national accounting 
systems across Europe, affecting thousands of companies over time, continues to generate 
controversy. The costs and benefits of IFRS implementation to date in Europe continues to 
receive much attention from empirical academic researchers since it is still unclear how 
benefits and/or costs of IFRS adoption are only attributable to the change of financial 
reporting standards. Some literature is discussed below about this subject, being presented 
different perspectives for each objective outlined in Regulation 1606/2002. 
                                               
2 The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is the independent standard-setting body of 
the IFRS Foundation responsible for developing and promoting the use of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). 
3 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is the national professional 
organization for Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) in the United States. 
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2.3.1. Does IFRS adoption result in greater transparency? 
 
One of the objectives is the improvement of transparency of financial statements 
allowing investors to understand the reporting firms' financial performance and make 
informed financial decisions. The evidence of improvement of transparency can be proxied 
through three areas of research, namely, investment analysts’ forecasting ability; value 
relevance and accounting quality. Thus, ceteris paribus, an improvement in forecasting 
should be accompanied by an increase in value relevance and an improvement in accounting 
quality.  
A broad comparison between national accounting standards and IFRS, allows to 
conclude that the later has brought greater disclosure of information in financial statements 
(Ernst & Young, 2006
4
) and focuses on fair-values and balance sheet valuation (Hung and 
Subramanyam 2007). These factors may convey more information in financial reports, 
especially earnings information, which will allow financial analysts predict future earnings 
with higher accuracy. On the other hand, the emphasis on fair-value view leaves much more 
discretion to the management, which could result in more volatile earnings and higher 
analysts' forecast errors. Some findings of research about investment analysts’ forecasting 
ability is presented below. 
Wang et al. (2008) look at evidence on changes in the accuracy and dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts following mandatory IFRS adoption in 17 European countries for the 
period 2003-2006. Wang et al. (2008) find that for mandatory IFRS adopters the analysts’ 
earnings forecast errors and dispersion are significantly lower than compared with pre-IFRS. 
Regarding firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS before 2005, Wang et al. (2008) provide 
evidence that analysts’ earnings forecast errors and dispersion are significantly lower in the 
period 2005-2006 than in the period 2003-2004, which means that these firms also reflect 
the informational change around 2005. Furthermore, Wang et al. (2008) classify the sample 
countries into code law and common law groups and the results suggest that mandatory 
IFRS adoption is significantly associated with lower forecast errors and dispersion in 
common law countries while for code law countries there is no change in the forecast 
accuracy or dispersion. 
                                               
4 2005 financial statements are generally 20% to 30% greater in length than their 2004 financial 
statements. 
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Houqe et al. (2014) also look at effects of mandatory IFRS adoption in analyst 
forecast accuracy and dispersion. They decide to use as sample countries France, Germany 
and Sweden because according to World Economic Forum’s 2012/2013 Global 
Competitiveness Report these countries are characterized as low investor protection and 
because they represent three different code law traditions (French, German and 
Scandinavian legal origin). The authors use data from the years 2003 and 2011, that is, they 
chose a year before the IFRS adoption and another year following the IFRS where the new 
insights underlying the adoption of IFRS are already consolidated. Overall, Houqe et al. 
(2014) find that mandatory IFRS adoption improved both forecast accuracy and dispersion 
in all three code law countries, even after controlling for industry and country effects, which 
contradicts the findings of Wang et al. (2008). 
On the other hand, the study of Preiato et al. (2015) test the effectiveness of three 
new enforcements proxies in financial analysts' earnings forecast. These three proxies were 
published by Brown et al. (2014) and they are based on auditing and accounting 
enforcement. These proxies are available for 51 countries in 2002, 2005 and 2008. However, 
Preiato et al. (2015) only use 39 countries in their sample countries for the period 2003-
2009. Thus, the objective is to test whether these three proxies capture important differences 
between countries information environments beyond the traditional proxies for legal 
enforcement used in prior researches. After controlling for such new enforcements proxies, 
the results suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption per se is not enough to decrease analysts' 
forecast errors and dispersion. 
Thus, while Wang et al. (2008) do not find evidence of an improvement in both 
forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion to code law countries, Houqe et al. (2014) provide 
such evidence using France, Germany and Sweden as examples of code law countries and 
with low investor protection. In turn, Preiato et al. (2015) suggest that the improvement in 
both forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion may be due to better auditing and 
enforcement of financial reporting rather than to the adoption of IFRS per se. Notice that the 
studies from Houqe et al. (2014) and Preiato et al. (2015) look at longer post-adoption 
periods than the study the Wang et al. (2008) which only considers one year ahead IFRS 
adoption. Finally, the sample countries of Preiato et al. (2015) includes some countries 
whose not belong to Europe and therefore it is unclear whether such results remain 
unchanged for European Union. 
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Regarding to another area of research, namely, value relevance, it can be defined as 
the ability of accounting measures to explain variation in stock returns (Hung and 
Subramanyam 2007). Thus, the assumption under this view is that, if stock market prices (or 
changes in prices) are reflections of firms’ financial reality, a positive relation between 
accounting measures and stock market prices (or changes in prices) mean that accounting 
measures convey the true financial position of firm. The focus of academic researchers is 
whether this relationship has strengthened following mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007) look at comparability between IAS
5
 and German 
GAAP accounting systems. Notice that Germany encouraged early adoption of International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) and therefore large number of German firms have adopted IAS 
before the mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005. As consequent, firms that have adopted IAS 
were required to restate their prior financial statements under both German GAAP and IAS 
during the adoption year. In this way, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) could compare 
directly the same accounting numbers under both different accounting systems. Using a 
sample of German industrial firms that adopted IAS for the first time during the period 
1998-2002, the results suggest that book value of equity and net income are no more value 
relevant under IAS than under German GAAP.   
Paananen and Lin (2009) also used the case of Germany to test the value relevance 
of accounting numbers ensuring that institutional characteristics hold constant. In turn, the 
authors use three time periods, namely, 2000-2002 (IAS/voluntary), 2003-2004 
(IFRS/voluntary) and 2005-2006 (IFRS/mandatory). During the period 2000-2006 there 
were several revisions and new additions of accounting standards by the IASB and therefore 
the division of sample in three times periods has as objective to capture potential changes in 
accounting environment between such periods. Paananen and Lin (2009) also used Industrial 
German listed companies and find evidence that both book value of equity as earnings 
became less value relevant following mandatory IFRS adoption compared to both the IAS 
and IFRS voluntary period. 
Barth et al. (2008) explore whether the adoption of International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) are followed by an increase in the value relevance of accounting data. The 
authors use firms that adopted IAS between 1994 and 2003 from 21 countries and as 
                                               
5
 IAS standards were issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) from 1973 to 2000. 
IASC was succeeded by International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in 2001, which issues IFRS.  
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hypothesized, they find that firms which adopt the IAS present higher association between 
accounting data and stock prices and returns, interpreting these findings as higher 
accounting quality. 
In turn, Zeghal et al. (2012) study the value relevance of accounting data in 15 
European countries for the period 2002-2004 and 2006-2007. The authors find ample 
evidence that value relevance of earnings and book-equity decreases following IFRS 
adoption. In addition, the authors find that these findings are more accentuated for the firms 
in countries where pre-existing domestic standards have less similarities with the IFRS. 
In sum, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) and Paananen and Lin (2009) use the 
German case to suggest that IFRS adoption has neutral or negative impact on the value 
relevance of book value of equity and earnings. In turn, Barth et al. (2008) and Zeghal et al. 
(2012) extend their analyses to more countries but obtain opposite results regarding to the 
impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting data. 
Accounting quality is the last proxy to measure whether post-IFRS adoption is 
associated with an increase in transparency of accounting information. It is a wide concept 
heavily used by researchers and therefore the findings are extensive. Generally, researchers 
investigate some phenomena that are taken as indicator of poor accounting quality, namely, 
earnings management; high accruals and less timely loss recognition.  
In addition to the value relevance analysis above mentioned, Barth et al. (2008) also 
explore whether the adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS) are associated to 
lower earnings management and more timely loss. Earnings management involves managers 
taking advantage of gaps in accounting rules to report more positive earnings than they 
really are. In turn, timely loss recognition reflects the more timely recognition of bad news 
than good news in earnings (Basu 1997). Barth et al. (2008) find that firms which adopt the 
IAS present higher accounting quality than those which do not adopt, which is supported by 
lower earnings management and more timely loss recognition.  
In the same vein, Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) predict that as IFRS adoption 
brought more investor-oriented information, in countries with traditional bank-oriented 
accounting system like Germany, the managers will have less incentive to manipulate the 
earnings. The sample is constituted by German listed companies for the period 1999-2001. 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) assume that high (low) magnitude of absolute 
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discretionary accruals
6
 and negative (positive) correlation between total reported accruals 
and operating cash flow indicate high (low) level of earnings management. Contrary to their 
prediction, they find that voluntary IFRS adopters engage more in earnings management 
than the firms that reporting under German GAAP, but that this increase weakens if the 
firms have a BIG4 as auditor.  
The Kaserer and Klingler (2008) findings also meet the results from Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005). Kaserer and Klingler (2008) start by define earnings as the sum of its 
cash flow and its accrual component and suggest that investors do not give attention to 
accrual component. The investors tend to become optimistic (pessimistic) regarding firms 
with high (low) accruals, resulting in firms overvalued (undervalued) and as consequent 
generate low (high) returns, that is, accrual anomaly. Thus, Kaserer and Klingler (2008) test 
accrual anomaly in Germany for the period 1995 to 2002 and find that during the period 
2000-2002 there is evidence of accrual anomaly in Germany especially for firms that 
comply with IAS. Callao and Jarne (2010) also explore whether earnings management have 
increased after IFRS adoption but in 11 European countries for the period 2003-2006. They 
find an increase in discretionary accruals following IFRS adoption in France, Spain and 
United Kingdom. 
In another study, Armstrong et al. (2010) provide evidence that an improvement in 
information quality is expected by investors. They examine the market reaction to 16 events 
associated with the adoption of IFRS in 18 European countries over the period 2002-2005. 
They find that the set of firms which presented lower quality pre-adoption information and 
higher pre-adoption information asymmetry, exhibit a positive reaction to events associated 
with IFRS adoption which means that investors expect a positive impact in quality 
information on these countries.  
In short, the results of Barth et al. (2008) suggest an improvement in accounting 
quality. However, the studies of Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Kaserer and Klingler 
(2008) provide evidence that German firms which adopt IAS engage more in earnings 
management and overvalued the earnings through accrual component which is not perceived 
by market participants. In the study of Barth et al. (2008), Germany represents 18% of firm 
year observations (third country with the highest weight in the sample) but it was also 
considered non-European countries (e.g., Australia, China or Russia) and therefore these 
                                               
6 Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) define discretionary accruals as actual total reported accruals less expected 
normal accruals. 
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studies may not be directly compared. In addition, Callao et al. (2010) explore only in 
Europeans countries and find an increase in discretionary accruals following IFRS adoption 
in France, Spain and United Kingdom. 
 
2.3.2. Does IFRS adoption improve information comparability? 
 
Another objective of adopting the IFRS is the improvement of comparability 
between financial reports. The characteristic of comparability allows an investor to compare 
an economic phenomenon that happened in two different companies from two different 
countries but which was reported similarly, lowering the cost of processing information for 
investor.  
Some research has analyzed whether the application of IFRS benefits the global 
investors through enhanced comparability of financial reports.  However, these studies focus 
on the comparison among the ex ante and post of firms domiciled in countries where the 
local accounting rules differed significantly from IFRS. In turn, Brochet et al. (2013) argue 
that directors and officers (“insiders”) have access to private information of companies in 
they work and use it to decide if they should buy shares of such company. So it is likely that 
these insiders have abnormal returns through the share purchases. However, in the authors’ 
perspective, this information asymmetry may be reduced through the increase of 
requirements of disclosures with IFRS adoption or through the increase of comparability 
among firms from different countries because, this way, the investors have the possibility of 
using information from other comparable industry firms and adjust their expectations. In 
order to explore the exclusive effect of changes in comparability, Brochet et al. (2013) 
restrict their study to U.K. listed companies (2003-2006), since prior literature has suggested 
that there are few differences between the U.K. GAAP and IFRS and, therefore, the impact 
of IFRS adoption in U.K. will be mainly driven by comparability effects. As had been 
hypothesized, the abnormal returns achieved by insiders decreased after IFRS adoption in 
U.K., for both short-term and longer-term, which is interpreted by the authors as an increase 
in comparability. 
Lang et al. (2010) also look at the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on financial 
reporting comparability. The authors assess the accounting comparability basing on the 
principle that “given a similar set of economic transactions (as reflected in stock returns), 
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firm j should produce similar earnings to firm i” (Lang et al. 2010, p.13). Thus, whether the 
accounting numbers are comparable, firms with similar stock returns should have similar 
accounting returns. Lang et al. (2010) compare IFRS adopters to a benchmark group of non-
IFRS adopters across 26 countries for the period 2001-2006 and the results suggest that 
accounting comparability does not increase for IFRS adopters in comparison with the non-
IFRS adopters.  
Overall, the Brochet et al. (2013) findings based on U.K. market seems to indicate 
that IFRS adoption increases the comparability of financial reports while Lang et al. (2010), 
focusing on an extensive sample, conclude that IFRS adoption does not increase the cross-
country comparability. 
 
2.3.3. Does IFRS adoption reduce companies’ cost of capital? 
 
Cost of capital is the return that an investor expects to receive from an investment, 
which is associated to a given level of risk. Therefore, the lower the risk that the firm incurs, 
the less will be the rate of return required by investors to invest in their projects, that is, the 
lower its cost of capital. Daske et al. (2013) in their study discriminate two types of IFRS 
adopters: the ones that, in theory, adopted the new set of accounting standards but, in 
practise, did not change their financial reports - "Label adopters" - and the ones that took 
advantage of IFRS adoption to increase its transparency for investors - "Serious adopters". 
Daske et al. (2013), using a sample period between 1990 and 2005 across 30 countries, 
explore whether investors are able to distinguish between these two types of adopters 
generating different effects on the capital market. They find that “Serious adopters” exhibit 
a decline in cost of capital and an increase in liquidity (discussed below) while in the case of 
"Label adopters" this does not happen. 
Li (2010) studies the behaviour of cost of capital for mandatory adopters versus 
voluntary adopters using 18 European countries for the period 1995-2006. The author 
measure the cost of capital using the mean of four estimates from implied cost of capital 
models proposed in the literature and find that mandatory adopters experience a reduction in 
the average cost of capital of 47 basis points while voluntary adopters do not present a 
significant change in the cost of capital post-2005. Moreover, the author repeats the 
regression analysis adding a variable to control the legal enforcement by each country and 
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find that firms in countries with strong legal enforcement experience a reduction in the cost 
of capital of 91 basis points while in countries with poor legal enforcement the mandatory 
adopters do not exhibit any change in cost of capital. The author suggests that the quality of 
legal enforcement may be responsible for the effective accounting changes. 
Overall, the evidence seems to support the idea that IFRS adoption reduces the cost 
of capital of firms, especially for those which adopt in strategically manner. Li (2010) alerts 
that such reduction is dependent of each country’s legal enforcement level. 
 
2.3.4. Does IFRS adoption increase market liquidity? 
 
Increase market liquidity is another Regulation’s objective. As noted in the previous 
section, Daske et al. (2013) find that "Serious adopters" are benefited with increased 
liquidity when they combine the mandatory adoption of standards with its corporate 
strategy. Before, Daske et al. (2008) also analyzed the effects of IFRS adoption on market 
liquidity across 26 countries. Using an extensive sample of mandated firms from 2001 to 
2005, they use four dependent variables in order to measure the liquidity, that is, proportion 
of zero returns, the price impact of trades, total trading costs and bid-ask spreads. According 
to these authors the IFRS adopters experience an increase in market liquidity regarding to 
the non-IFRS adopters. Furthermore, they suggested that the voluntary adopters present 
higher liquidity benefits than mandatory adopters. 
In turn, Christensen et al. (2013) using 35 adopters countries for the period 2001-
2009 suggest that the improvements in liquidity reported by Daske et al. (2008) is restricted 
to countries which at the time of IFRS adoption also introduced significant enforcement 
changes. For these countries the authors find that market liquidity increases between 18% to 
23% regarding to pre-IFRS period, concluding that benefits of improved liquidity depends 
of enforcement degree in each country. 
Shibly and Dumontier (2014) also used three of four measures of liquidity used in 
Daske et al. (2008), namely, proportion of zero returns, the price impact of trades and bid-
ask spreads. However, they added firm size variable (measured by market-value) in order to 
capture firms’ information environment. Their sample is constituted by 14 European 
Countries into the period 1999-2009. The authors find that both large and small firms 
experience an increase in market liquidity following IFRS adoption, but that this is 
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strengthened for small firms. They argue that small firms operate in poor information 
environments and therefore the increase of disclosures requirements underlying the IFRS 
adoption will increase the information available in market and thus the firms will benefit 
from higher liquidity in the market. 
In short, the evidence also seems to support the idea that IFRS adoption has a 
positive effect on liquidity. However, Christensen et al. (2013) state that this improvement 
depends of concurrent enforcement changes. Moreover, Shibly and Dumontier (2014) added 
that IFRS adoption effects are stronger under small firms than large firms, providing higher 
quality accounting information and thus higher liquidity. 
 
2.3.5. Does IFRS adoption reduce the barriers to international investment? 
 
The process of investment decision involves many variables and accounting 
information is one of them. As previously mentioned, increased comparability between 
financial information from several countries reduce the costs of information processing, and 
therefore whether the financial information is presented in standard form, the information 
asymmetry between investors decreases since they will rely more on public financial 
statements and therefore it is expected that they are more willing to hold securities in foreign 
markets. One of the most relevant studies on this topic belongs to Yu (2010).  
Yu (2010) examines the changes in mutual fund holdings in firms following 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. The sample is composed by voluntary-, mandatory- and non-
adopters from 28 countries during the period 2000 to 2007. The author finds that due to the 
reduced costs of information processing underlying the IFRS adoption, the proportion of 
shares held by foreign mutual funds increases 2.7% and 2.4% for mandatory adopters and 
voluntary adopters, respectively. For non-adopters there was no change. Yu (2010) also 
explores whether the adoption of IFRS can mitigate the impact of geographic distance 
between the investee and investor. The results show that the standardization of financial 
reporting standards reduces the "accounting distance", that is, the comparability between 
accounting standards of investee and investor increases, fostering the cross-border holdings. 
The results also suggest that there is a positive relationship between foreign mutual fund 
holdings and the joint outcome of IFRS adoption with the degree of enforcement in each 
adopting country. 
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 Another complementary study is from DeFond et al. (2011). In this case, the 
comparability occurs at the level of investee firms within industries in different countries. In 
their study, DeFond et al. (2011) hypothesizes that the IFRS adoption improves the 
comparability which leads to increased investment by foreign mutual funds. To test their 
prediction, they use firms from 14 European countries which have adopted the standards 
mandatorily during the period 2003-2007 and they find that the adoption of IFRS leads to a 
huge increase in foreign investment between countries with a credible enforcement and 
greater uniformity. In another study, Landsman et al. (2012) explore on the extent to which 
IFRS adoption can increase the information content and one of the three mechanisms 
approached is the foreign portfolio investment. They hypothesizes that the IFRS adoption 
has a positive impact in information content whether IFRS adoption is linked with increased 
levels of foreign investment. They compute the foreign investment as the total in bound 
foreign portfolio investment in equity securities. The sample comprises firms from 16 
countries for the period 2002-2007 and they provide evidence that IFRS affect the 
information content of earnings via higher foreign investment. 
Overall, the evidence supports the conclusion that mandatory IFRS adoption has 
fostered the international investment. However, the authors call attention to the legal 
enforcement in each country which may contribute for effective increase of foreign 
investment. 
 
2.3.6. The role of enforcement on accounting quality. 
 
All studies mentioned above refer the importance of enforcement among countries 
and they conclude that a set of uniform standards is not enough by itself to promote a 
common accounting language. Ball (2006) draws attention to this problem arguing that the 
quality of financial reporting is dependent on the influence that local political and economic 
factors have on managers and regulators. Although there is some coordination at the EU 
level on the enforcement through the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
7
, 
the monitoring and enforcement of IFRS practise is from the responsibility of national 
regulators (Nobes 2013). However, Kvaal and Nobes (2010) explore for a sample countries 
(Australia, France, Germany, Spain and United Kingdom) whether the national patterns of 
                                               
7 In 2011 the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) succeed the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR). 
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accounting persist on transition to IFRS in 2005 and they provide evidence that pre-IFRS 
national practises have continued in 2005/6 financial statements (under IFRS). Furthermore, 
the financial statements of the same companies are examined again in 2008 and the reports 
show that national patterns remain (Kvaal and Nobes 2012). Thus, in countries where the 
enforcement is not effective, the firms labelled as IFRS adopters might not be in fact comply 
with IFRS. 
 
Overall, prior literature divides in different scopes and techniques of research, 
generating different results and contributions. In an individual analysis by Regulation's 
objective, the literature seems to be consistent in showing at least some improvements in 
cost of capital, market liquidity and cross-border investment (Daske et al. 2008, Yu 2010, Li 
2010, DeFond et al. 2011, Daske et al. 2013, Christensen et al. 2013, Shibly and Dumontier 
2014). On the other hand, regarding to the transparency and comparability the literature is 
not so clear. Some academic researchers suggest that following IFRS adoption firms 
experience an improvement in transparency (Wang et al. 2008, Barth et al. 2008, Armstrong 
et al. 2010, Houqe et al. 2014) and in comparability (Brochet et al. 2013); while other 
academic researchers find little or no evidence of improved transparency (Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen 2005, Hung and Subramanyam 2007, Kaserer and Klingler 2008, Paananen and 
Lin 2009, Callao and Jarne 2010, Zeghal et al. 2012, Preiato et al. 2015) and comparability 
(Lang et al. 2010). Although European countries constitute large part of the sample of each 
study, it should be noted that in some studies were used non-European countries and 
therefore it is not clear whether its findings would hold for the European Union. Finally, 
because there are many doubts about the enforcement on IFRS adoption in each country, it 
is not clear whether changes above discussed are only attributable to the change of financial 
reporting standards. 
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3. Hypothesis Development 
  On the premise that the market is efficient (Fama 1991), Beaver et al. (1980) and 
Kothari and Sloan (1992) show that stock returns are able to explain future earnings 
changes, that is, prices leading earnings. This relation is relevant and pertinent, since it 
reflects the ability of prices to price financial information. However, we find little evidence 
for Europe on this issue. Thus, it is hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Price changes (i.e, stock returns) of European firms anticipate future earnings 
changes. 
 
In 2005, the European Union requires that listed companies prepare their financial 
statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). As we 
have seen in the literature review, the IFRS has a defined set of objectives which aim to 
improve the financial information provided by firms to the market.  
Since there is a change in the accounting environment following IFRS adoption, we 
explore if such change affects the ability of stock returns to anticipate future earnings 
changes. We also study this change partitioning our sample into profit and loss firms. 
However, the predict signal of this change is uncertain since there is evidence that 
support the benefits of adopting IFRS while others do not, as shown in the literature review 
section. Thus, it is hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The mandatory IFRS adoption affects the ability of stock returns to anticipate 
future earnings changes (price lead earnings). 
 
The literature is consistent to infer that a set of uniform standards is not enough by 
itself to increase the quality of financial reporting, but it that depends on enforcement 
mechanisms and institutional factors across European countries (Ball 2006, Christensen et 
al. 2013, Preiato et al. 2015). In line with previous research, we conducted an extensive 
analysis to gauge potential country-level characteristics which may influence the effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on the prices lead earnings relation. Thus, it is hypothesizes: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the prices lead earnings relation 
is conditioned by country-level characteristics. 
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4. Methodology, sample and data sources 
 
4.1. Methodology 
 
In this section we set out the model used to explore the impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption in the ability of stock returns to anticipate future earnings changes. We follow 
Sadka and Sadka (2009) empirical methodology. The model used is the joint outcome of 
market efficiency and the rational expectations introduced by Muth (1961), where the 
realized value is equivalent to the current expectations estimated under all information 
available. Thus, Sadka and Sadka (2009) use actual realizations as proxy for expectations 
since prices fully reflect all available information. 
Sadka and Sadka (2009) in order to explore the predictability of earnings run the 
following regression: 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 ∗ ∆𝑋𝑡+1 +  𝜀𝑡  
 where 𝑅𝑡  is the share return at time t and ∆𝑋𝑡+1 is a proxy for earnings changes at time t+1. 
Using the methodology of Sadka and Sadka (2009), we specify our baseline stock 
returns equation as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+  𝐷𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
  
where, 
𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  : is the stock returns of firm i at t; 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡+1 : is the earnings changes of firm i at t+1; 
𝑀𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡  : is the market value of firm i at time t; 
𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡  : is the book value equity of firm i at time t; 
𝐷𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 : is a dummy variable for year; 
𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 : is a dummy variable for country; 
𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 : is a dummy variable for a firm’s industry membership based on Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
 
Equation (2) allows us to test the Hypothesis 1 since the coefficient 𝛽1 measures the 
ability of stock returns to predict future earnings changes one year ahead (i.e., prices lead 
(2) 
(1) 
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earnings). Although in the equation (2) the earnings changes (∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1) has been 
presented scaled by 𝑀𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡 , we also rerun the equation (2) using ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 deflated by 𝐵𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡  
variable. We include dummy variables to control for year-, country- and industry-specific 
factors that may affect the stock returns. 
The main objective of this study is to explore the impact of IFRS adoption in the 
ability of stock returns to anticipate future earnings changes (Hypothesis 2). In order to 
capture such impact we run the following equation: 
 
𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 𝑖 ,𝑡+1
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽2
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 𝑖 ,𝑡+1
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝐷𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
 
where the  IFRSi,t+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for mandatory IFRS adopters in 2005, 
and 0 if otherwise. We also rerun the equation (3) using book-value of equity as deflator. 
The sign of coefficient β2 is of greatest interest since it captures the impact of IFRS 
adoption in the prices lead earnings relation. 
Note that we partition the sample between profit and loss firm-year observations 
because this is common in empirical research, following evidence in Hayn (1995) that 
earnings response coefficient is significantly larger for profit firms than for loss firms. We 
then regress the equations (2) and (3) on these two sub-samples of firm-year observations. 
Finally, prior literature documents that the quality of accounting system is 
dependent on country-level factors (Hypothesis 3). To address this issue, we include 
additional controls that may explain returns as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 𝑖 ,𝑡+1
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽2
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 𝑖 ,𝑡+1
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡+1 
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 +  𝛽8𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑡+1 +  𝛽9𝑈𝐴𝑉𝑡+1 +  𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡+1 + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑡+1 
+ 𝛽12𝐶𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽13𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑡+1 +  𝛽14𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑡+1 +  𝐷𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡   
where, 
𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡+1 : is the logarithm of GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) by country at t+1; 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡+1 : is the GDP growth rate (annual %) by country at t+1; 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡+1 : is the market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) at t+1; 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 : is the total value of stocks traded to the average market capitalization (%) at t+1; 
(3) 
(4) 
26 
 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 : is the domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) at t+1; 
𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑡+1 : is the individualism index at t+1; 
𝑈𝐴𝑉𝑡+1 : is the uncertainty avoidance index at t+1; 
𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡+1 : is the rule of law index at t+1; 
𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑡+1 : is the anti-director rights index at t+1; 
𝐶𝑅𝑡+1 : is the credit rights index at t+1; 
𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑡+1 : is the legal system (1 if Code Law; 0 if Common Law) at t+1; 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑡+1 : is the Ownership Concentration at t+1. 
 
The control variables introduced into the equation can be categorized into the 
following groups: (i) economic development; (ii) stock market development; (iii) cultural 
features; (iv) investor protection and (v) ownership structure. 
We use two proxies for the economic development, namely, the log of GDP per 
capita in US dollars (Log_GDPC) and the annual growth rate of GDP (GDPG). Countries 
with higher value of Log_GDPC indicate a higher level of economic performance, being 
more robust. In turn, developed countries tend to exhibit stable GDP growth rates for long 
periods of time (Lucas 1988). Leuz et al. (2003) suggest that the volatility of GDP growth 
rate influence the volatility of accounting earnings. In addition, La Porta et al. (1998) 
suggest a positive relationship between richer countries and the quality of law enforcement. 
The second set is associated with stock market development. The first measure is 
the country stock market capitalization of listed companies scaled by GDP (SIZE) and the 
second measure is the turnover ratio (TURN) defined as the ratio of the total value of stocks 
traded to the average market capitalization in a given country. These two measures are a 
proxy for the degree of development of the equity market. The last measure is the domestic 
credit to private sector by banks (CREDIT), which captures the degree of development of 
credit market. The dichotomy between equity market and credit market has been appointed 
in the literature as one reason for existing differences in national accounting systems across 
European countries. Firms from countries dominated by the equity-oriented financial system 
focus on disclosing more information in order to allow investors to make informed decisions 
and to raise money, as a way of financing their operational activity. On the other hand, in 
countries dominated by the credit-oriented system, the financial needs are provided by banks 
so, as these financial institutions have access to private information about firm performance, 
the demand by public relevant information will be low. 
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Then we focus on cultural aspects of each country. We use the individualism index 
(IDV) and the uncertainty avoidance index (UAV), reported by Hofstede (2010), which are 
both based on a psychological survey of IBM employees in 76 countries and include about 
88,000 respondents. A country with high value on the individualism index indicates that 
people in that country focus on their internal attributes and do not depend on others, living in 
an individualistic environment (as in the U.K. and the Netherlands, for example). In turn, a 
country with high value on the uncertainty aversion index indicates that people in that 
country do not feel comfortable in uncertain or unknown situations and, therefore, desire 
stability (as in Greece and Portugal, for example). 
We explore the impact of investor protection mechanisms and legal environment 
using four indicators. First, a proxy for shareholder rights, which is the revised anti-director 
rights index (ADR) of Djankov et al. (2008). This index ranges from 0 to 6 and countries 
labelled with 6 have a very good shareholder protection. The second indicator is the creditor 
rights index (CR) of Djankov et al. (2007), which is the updated creditor rights index 
conducted by La Porta et al. (1998). This index ranges from 0 to 4 and in countries labelled 
with 4 the creditors have a strong possession on firms, being the first to be reimbursed in the 
event of bankruptcy. The third measure is the rule of law (ROL) index available in the World 
Bank database. The rule of law is based on the principle that all people and institutions are 
subject to and accountable to law that is fairly applied and enforced. This index ranges from 
-2.5 to 2.5. Finally, the fourth measure is a dummy variable that captures the type of legal 
system (LEGAL), that is, between code law and common law (1 if code law; 0 if otherwise). 
The literature suggests that the code law system provides lower protection for both 
shareholders and creditors than the common law system (La Porta et al. 2000). 
 Finally, the last variable regards the ownership structure (OWNER). La Porta et al. 
(1998, 1999) find a negative relationship between the quality of investor protection and the 
concentrated control of firms, that is, in countries with weak legal protections for 
shareholders, the corporate ownership structure tend to be controlled by blockholders. We 
use the ownership structure of our sample firms as proxy for the ownership structure of each 
country. Specifically, we use data from Worldscope database (field 08021), which is 
computed by the number of closely held shares to common shares outstanding. Appendix A 
provides definitions and data for all country-level characteristics. 
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4.2. Sample and data sources 
 
The accounting data used in this study is from Worldscope database, whereas 
market data is from Thomson Financial Datastream database. The data gathered was 
organized in panel data format for sixteen European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. The sample period covers the years from 1999 
to 2011. 
We require sample firms to have adopted IFRS mandatorily in 2005 in order to 
capture the impact of IFRS adoption on prices lead earnings relation. A fiscal year-end 
restriction is applied and, therefore, only firms with a fiscal year end between on December 
31
st
 and April 30
th
 are included. We consider this reporting time interval since great portion 
of U.K. firms have a reporting period different than the calendar year
8
. We exclude firms 
with missing values for any variable in the model, as well as firms operating in the financial 
sector. We eliminated firm-observations of year 2005 in order to avoid the noise underlying 
the transition to new accounting standards (DeFond et al. 2011). To mitigate the influence of 
outliers, we winsorize all variables used in our regressions at the 1% level. Finally, countries 
with less than 100 firm-year observations are eliminated.  
In sum, the final sample consists of 16,755 firm-year observations, across 16 
countries and 1,937 non-financial firms for the sample period from 1999 to 2011. 
 
4.2.1. Data Construction 
The construction of the final sample data can be divided in two phases: the merger 
between databases and the calculation of annual return. First, from Worldscope database 
was obtained the list of firms; accounting data; date of fiscal year end and accounting 
standard followed by each firm. From the Datastream database was collected the market 
value and monthly return index. Then, this information set was merged. 
Second, in order to compute the annual return of each company it is necessary to 
define the date on which the earnings of a firm are disclosure to the market. As proxy to this 
                                               
8 In our sensitivity analysis, we restrict our sample to firms with a fiscal-year end on December 31 
and the results are qualitatively similar. 
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date, it was used the Worldscope item Earnings Per Share Report Date (the Worldscope field 
05905). Thus, the time interval considered in this study to compute the annual returns was 
the 12-month period before the earnings announcement date (the Worldscope field 05905), 
as follow: 
 
Figure 1 - Time interval for annual returns 
Thus, with the time interval defined, the next step is to compute the annual returns, 
as follow: 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  𝑒  ln (1+𝑟𝑒𝑡  
12
𝑡=1 − 1 
where 𝑟𝑒𝑡 stands for monthly return. It should be noted that it was also excluded the 
companies that did not have 12 monthly returns in order to be possible to calculate the 
annual returns. 
 
4.2.2. Identification of IFRS adoption 
The identification of one IFRS adopter is a key point in this study, since we want to 
capture the mandatory IFRS adoption effect on prices lead earnings relation. The 
information about a firm’s IFRS adoption was obtained from Worldscope database. 
Worldscope field 07536, Accounting standards followed, identifies 23 different accounting 
standards followed by firms
9
, including the Local Accounting Standards (the Worldscope 
field 07536 = 01); the International Accounting Standards (IAS) issued by IASC (the 
Worldscope field 07536 = 02); the IFRS issued by IASB (the Worldscope field 07536 = 23) 
and some accounting standards that adopted IFRS partially but which according to the 
coding of Worldscope are considered IFRS adopters (the Worldscope field 07536 = 06, 08, 
12, 16, 18 or 19). 
                                               
9 Appendix B provides a detailed description of field 07536, as recorded in Worldscope database. 
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In this study, a company is classified as an IFRS adopter if the Worldscope 
description is IAS or IFRS (the Worldscope field 07536 = 02 or 23) and as non-adopter 
IFRS if (1) the company has adopted one of the several cases described in the coding of 
Worldscope regarding to local accounting standards or if (2) the company adopted IFRS 
partially (accounting standards with some EU, OECD, IASC or IASB guidelines, 
Worldscope field 07536 = 06, 08, 12, 16, 18 or 19)
10
. 
This classification does not follow in full the approach used in Daske et al. (2013) 
which is considered in several papers (Wu and Zhang 2009, Tan et al. 2011, Landsman et al. 
2012, Bozos et al. 2014). In their study, Daske et al. (2013) follow the coding of Worldscope 
database both for adopters and non-adopters of IFRS, and therefore, the companies which 
adopted IFRS partially were also considered as IFRS adopters. However, we consider a 
stricter classification for IFRS adopters for two reasons. Firstly, in the same study, Daske et 
al. (2013) compare the IFRS classification of Worldscope with Global Vantage (GV) 
databases and obtain the lower contradiction rate between them, only when they considere 
the Worldscope field 07536 = 02 and 23 and the Global Vantage field ASTD = DI
11
 . 
Secondly, some classifications of Worldscope field 07536 are ambiguous, being not clear 
which is the firm´s reporting standards used. In turn, the Worldscope field 07536 = 02 and 
23 indicate clearly the accounting standards applied and, therefore, the use of this approach 
allows to reduce potential classification errors. Moreover, other relevant studies also use this 
stricter IFRS classification (Barth et al. 2012, Kim et al. 2014). 
 
After applying the above selection criteria, the final sample consists of 16,755 firm-
years observations. Table 1 presents the breakdown of firm-years over the period covered 
from 1999 to 2011. This sample can be disaggregated into two periods, pre- and post-
adoption of IFRS in 2005 by all listed European firms. The pre-adoption period contains 
7,059 firm-year observations while the post-adoption contains 9,696 firm-years 
observations. As mentioned before the year 2005 was eliminated in order to avoid the noise 
underlying the transition to new accounting standards. 
                                               
10 In our study we have not any company that has adopted the “International standards – 
inconsistency problems” or “International standards and some EU guidelines – inconsistency problems” 
(Worldscope field 07536 = 12 and 16, respectively). 
11 Global Vantage field ASTD = DI concerns the description "Domestic standards generally in 
accordance with IASC guidelines". 
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 Table 1 - Sample Composition by Year  
 Year Freq. Percent  
 1999 869 5.19  
 2000 819 4.89  
 2001 942 5.62  
 2002 1,194 7.13  
 2003 1,517 9.05  
 2004 1,718 10.25  
 2006 1,853 11.06  
 2007 1,713 10.22  
 2008 1,620 9.67  
 2009 1,566 9.35  
 2010 1,508 9  
 2011 1,436 8.57  
 Total 16,755 100  
Notes: Table 1 shows the number and percentage of firm-year observations 
per year for mandatory IFRS adopters. 
 
Table 2 presents the sample distribution by country. We can see that the number of 
unique firms and the number of total observations varies widely across the EU countries. For 
example, the United Kingdom has the largest number of firm-year observations (3,792) 
while Switzerland has the lowest (214). France and Sweden contribute with the second and 
third most firm-years, with 2,508 and 1,619, respectively. 
 
Table 2 - Sample Composition by Country 
Country   Unique Firms Firm-years 
Belgium 
 
42 333 
Denmark 
 
57 531 
Finland 
 
88 828 
France 
 
293 2,508 
Germany 
 
116 863 
Greece 
 
198 1,420 
Ireland 
 
26 242 
Italy 
 
149 1,294 
Netherlands 
 
84 866 
Norway 
 
86 726 
Poland 
 
61 448 
Portugal 
 
31 281 
Spain 
 
84 790 
Sweden 
 
197 1,619 
Switzerland 
 
23 214 
United Kingdom   402 3,792 
Total 
 
1,937 16,755 
Notes: Table 2 reports the number of mandatory adopters and the number of 
firm-year observations across countries. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables under analysis, such as the 
mean, standard deviation and percentiles. The sample mean of stock market annual return is 
10,8%, even though the volatility is high during the sample period, as indicated by standard 
deviation (approximately 59%). The kurtosis coefficient of 7.5 implies that this series 
strongly departs from normality since it exceeds 3, which is associated with a normal 
distribution. This shows that stock market annual returns are tailed to right side. In addition, 
it skewed to the right (1.7), which shows that investors in European’s stock market are likely 
to earn positive returns. 
Regarding earnings changes, both scaled by market value (∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉) and book 
value of equity (∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸), the descriptive statistics seem to indicate that the market-
value is a better deflator than the book-equity to predict future earnings changes, since it 
presents lower standard deviation (lower volatility) and, according to Graham et al. (2005), 
earnings volatility is negatively related to earnings predictability. The value of the skewness 
is positive for both (∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉) and (∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸), indicating that positive earnings 
changes are more common than negative earnings changes. Furthermore kurtosis coefficient 
is greater than 3 indicating that all earnings changes series are leptokurtic, having 
significantly fatter tails and higher peaks. 
 
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 Skewness Kurtosis 
Earnings (Earn) 16,755 174 1,189 0 9 60 5.2 183.1 
Book-Equity (BE) 16,755 1,597 7,349 38 142 574 11.9 194.3 
Market-Value (MV) 16,755 3,180 15,950 55 239 1,118 26.5 1,270.8 
𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  16,755 0.108 0.585 -0.261 0.016 0.338 1.7 7.5 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 16,755 0.022 0.286 -0.030 0.006 0.038 2.8 23.9 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 16,755 0.031 0.434 -0.053 0.012 0.072 2.2 25.2 
         Notes: Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis.
The dependent variable is 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  which corresponds to 12-month stock return ending at EPS report date. The 
independent variables are ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉(∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸) which denote the change in earnings before 
extraordinary items from years t+1 and t scaled by market-value (book-equity) at the end of year t. To mitigate 
the influence of outliers, we winsorize the dependent and independent variables at the 1% level. The first three 
variables were used to compute the independent variables (unit: millions). 
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Table 4 shows the Spearman (below the diagonal) and Pearson (above the diagonal) 
correlations coefficients between the exogenous variables and the three accounting variables 
under study. First of all, as can be observed, the correlation coefficients between Earnings 
(Earn) and Market Value (MV) and also between Earnings (Earn) and Book Equity (BE) are 
robust for a significance level of 1%, both under Spearman and Pearson’s correlations. 
These positive correlations indicate that these variables fluctuate together, being driven by 
positive or negative firm performance. 
 
Table 4 - Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrix 
Variable 
Earnings 
(Earn) 
Book-Equity 
(BE) 
Market-Value 
(MV) 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒕+𝟏_𝑴𝑽 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒕+𝟏_𝑩𝑬 
Earnings (Earn) 1 0.559*** 0.525*** 0.024*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 
Book-Equity (BE) 0.649*** 1 0.702*** -0.003 -0.011 -0.006 
Market-Value (MV) 0.696*** 0.892*** 1 0.036*** -0.007 0.001 
𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  0.224*** 0.077*** 0.201*** 1 0.207*** 0.146*** 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 0.249*** -0.015 0.036*** 0.293*** 1 0.487*** 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 0.281*** 0.026*** 0.092*** 0.285*** 0.881*** 1 
       Notes: Table 4 reports the Pearson's (above the diagonal) and Spearman's (below the diagonal) correlation coefficients 
among the variables used. The dependent variable is 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡which corresponds to 12-month stock return ending at EPS 
report date. The independent variables are ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉(∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸) which denote the change in earnings before 
extraordinary items from years t+1 and t scaled by market-value (book-equity) at the end of year t. To mitigate the 
influence of outliers, we winsorize the dependent and independent variables at the 1% level. The first three variables 
were used to compute the independent variables.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  
 
We find a significantly positive correlation between 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  and ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 
(∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸) with a Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.293 (0.285), suggesting that 
there is evidence of prices lead earnings relation. The Pearson correlation coefficients also 
suggest evidence of prices lead earnings relation at a significance level of 1%. However, the 
magnitude of correlation coefficient between 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  and ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 – 0.207 – is higher 
than between 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  and ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 – 0.146 –, which may indicate that the earnings 
predictability will be stronger under the market-value deflator. The magnitude of our 
correlation coefficient is in line with other studies, namely, Schleicher et al. (2007) and 
Dargenidou et al. (2011), which obtained a correlation coefficient of 0.218 and 0.302, 
respectively, both at a significance level of 1%. 
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5.2. Earnings Predictability Regressions 
 
5.2.1. Earnings Predictability 
 
We start by exploring whether prices changes (i.e., share returns) of European firms 
anticipate future earnings changes (Hypothesis 1). In order to test this hypothesis, we run the 
OLS regression of equation (2). 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the coefficients of predictability of earnings changes 
scaled by market-value while Panel B reports the coefficients of predictability of earnings 
changes scaled by book-equity.  
In Panel A of Table 5, the coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 obtained in the regression using 
dummy variables for year, country and industry is positive and significantly at the 1% for 
the full sample (0.336). That is, the change in earnings from years t+1 and t (scaled by 
market value at time t) are positively associated with annual stock returns at time t. 
Therefore, using market-value as deflator, there is evidence that prices changes of European 
firms anticipate future earnings changes. 
Subsequently, the full sample is divided according to earnings signal (Earn). For 
both profit and loss firms, the coefficients estimated on ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 are also positive and 
highly significant (p<0.01), after control by year, country and industry dummy variables. 
However, the magnitude of correlation coefficient for profitable firms (0.459) is higher than 
for loss firms (0.190). This result seems to indicate that prices changes of profit firms 
anticipate future earnings changes earlier than prices changes of loss firms. 
Regarding the Panel B, where the earnings changes are scaled by book-equity, we 
find results in line with the discussion above, that is, the coefficients estimated on 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 for the full sample and for both profitable and loss firms are positive and 
highly significant (p<0.01), after control by year, country and industry dummy variables. 
That is, there is also evidence of a prices lead earnings relation, with greater strength for 
profitable firms. 
Our results for earnings predictability are in line with previous literature. First, 
comparing the coefficients of ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 (Panel A) and ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 (Panel B) vis-à-
vis, we find that the magnitude of coefficients of Panel A are always higher than Panel B, 
indicating that market-value is a better deflator of earnings changes than book-equity, which 
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Table 5 - Earnings Predictability 
 
  
Earnings Predictability in Full Sample 
 
Earnings Predictability in Loss Firms 
 
Earnings Predictability in Profit Firms 
             
  
Regressions using dummy variables for: 
 
Regressions using dummy variables for: 
 
Regressions using dummy variables for: 
  
  Year and 
Country 
Year, Country 
and Industry 
 
  Year and 
Country 
Year, Country 
and Industry 
 
  Year and 
Country 
Year, Country 
and Industry Variable 
 
Year 
 
Year 
 
Year 
             Panel A: Regression analysis using Market-Value as deflator  
Intercept 
 
-0.096*** -0.057*** -0.085*** 
 
-0.277*** -0.222*** -0.235*** 
 
-0.037*** -0.010 -0.010 
  
(-9.44) (-4.28) (-4.62) 
 
(-13.92) (-7.45) (-6.40) 
 
(-3.33) (-0.68) (-0.46) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 
 
0.345*** 0.335*** 0.336*** 
 
0.192*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 
 
0.474*** 0.459*** 0.459*** 
  
(14.44) (14.27) (14.31) 
 
(7.06) (7.00) (7.02) 
 
(11.22) (11.10) (11.09) 
N 
 
16,755 16,755 16,755 
 
4,077 4,077 4,077 
 
12,678 12,678 12,678 
Adjusted 𝑅2 
 
0.262 0.273 0.274 
 
0.293 0.297 0.296 
 
0.266 0.276 0.277 
Panel B: Regression analysis using Book-Equity as deflator  
Intercept 
 
-0.098*** -0.059*** -0.083*** 
 
-0.286*** -0.226*** -0.237*** 
 
-0.027** -0.003 0.003 
  
(-9.74) (-4.36) (-4.48) 
 
(-14.70) (-7.59) (-6.45) 
 
(-2.43) (-0.17) (0.12) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 
 
0.164*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 
 
0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 
 
0.161*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
  
(11.37) (11.10) (11.12) 
 
(6.41) (6.40) (6.40) 
 
(7.15) (6.85) (6.85) 
N 
 
16,755 16,755 16,755 
 
4,077 4,077 4,077 
 
12,678 12,678 12,678 
Adjusted 𝑅2 
 
0.249 0.260 0.261 
 
0.287 0.292 0.291 
 
0.247 0.258 0.259 
             Notes: Table 5 presents OLS estimation results for equation (2) which intends to explore the ability of stock returns to anticipate future earnings changes. We also estimate 
the equation (2) on two sub-samples: loss and profit firms. The dependent variable is 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  which corresponds to 12-month stock return ending at EPS report date. The 
independent variables are ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉(∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸) which denote the change in earnings before extraordinary items from years t+1 and t scaled by market-value (book-
equity) at the end of year t.  
The equation (2) was first run with a dummy variable for each year from 1999 to 2011; we then added one dummy variable for each country in analysis and finally we added 
industry dummy variables constructed for each Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). We use White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for possible 
heteroskedasticity in the data. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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is consistent with a higher Pearson correlation coefficient between 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  and ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 
(0.207) than between 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  and ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 (0.146). 
Second, in any case – full sample, profit and loss firms – we find evidence that 
prices changes (i.e., share returns) of European firms anticipate future earnings changes, as 
well as other studies using U.S. data. These results are consistent with Beaver et al. (1980), 
Kothari and Sloan (1992) and Sadka and Sadka (2009), which conclude that stock returns 
explain future earnings changes. 
Third, comparing profitable firms with loss firms, we see that stock returns of profit 
firms exhibit greater ability to anticipate future earnings changes than stock returns of loss 
firms. These results are consistent with Hayn (1995), who finds that losses are less 
informative than profits about the future cash-flows of firms because of the liquidation 
option held by shareholders, which in turn weakens the earnings-returns relation. The author 
argues that the relation between stock returns and current earnings are stronger for profit 
firms than for loss firms. In addition, Schleicher et al. (2007) also find that stock returns of 
profit firms are able to anticipate earnings changes one year ahead, while the stock returns of 
loss firms are not. 
In sum, the stock returns of European firms are able to anticipate the future 
earnings changes, being market-value the better deflator to capture the predictability effect. 
In addition, the findings suggest that profit firms anticipate future earnings changes in a 
faster way than loss firms. 
 
 
 
5.2.2. IFRS adoption on Earnings Predictability 
 
The main objective of this study is to explore the impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption in the ability of stock returns to anticipate future earnings changes (Hypothesis 2). 
Table 6 presents the results of our OLS regression of the equation (3). 
The coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 obtained in the regression using dummy variables 
for year, country and industry remains positive and significantly at the 1% level, for full 
sample and both loss and profit firms (0.430; 0.293; 0.581). These results are consistent with 
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Table 6 - IFRS adoption on earnings predictability 
 
  
Earnings Predictability in Full Sample 
 
Earnings Predictability in Loss Firms 
 
Earnings Predictability in Profit Firms 
             
  
Regressions using dummy variables for: 
 
Regressions using dummy variables for: 
 
Regressions using dummy variables for: 
  
  Year and 
Country 
Year, Country 
and Industry 
 
  Year and 
Country 
Year, Country 
and Industry 
 
  Year and 
Country 
Year, 
Country and 
Industry Variable 
 
Year 
 
Year 
 
Year 
             Panel A: Regression analysis using Market-Value as deflator  
Intercept 
 
-0.095*** -0.056*** -0.084*** 
 
-0.282*** -0.226*** -0.243*** 
 
-0.032*** -0.005 -0.006 
  
(-9.44) (-4.17) (-4.62) 
 
(-14.51) (-7.63) (-6.62) 
 
(-2.90) (-0.32) (-0.27) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 
 
0.436*** 0.428*** 0.430*** 
 
0.291*** 0.290*** 0.293*** 
 
0.605*** 0.583*** 0.581*** 
  
(11.02) (10.92) (10.96) 
 
(6.05) (6.08) (6.12) 
 
(9.66) (9.39) (9.34) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 
 
-0.165*** -0.168*** -0.170*** 
 
-0.180*** -0.183*** -0.187*** 
 
-0.247*** -0.233*** -0.230*** 
  
(-3.40) (-3.53) (-3.56) 
 
(-3.20) (-3.29) (-3.35) 
 
(-2.98) (-2.87) (-2.83) 
N 
 
16,755 16,755 16,755 
 
4,077 4,077 4,077 
 
12,678 12,678 12,678 
Adjusted 𝑅2 
 
0.264 0.274 0.276 
 
0.296 0.300 0.300 
 
0.268 0.278 0.279 
Panel B: Regression analysis using Book-Equity as deflator  
Intercept 
 
-0.098*** -0.058*** -0.082*** 
 
-0.287*** -0.226*** -0.239*** 
 
-0.025** -0.001 0.004 
  
(-9.74) (-4.33) (-4.47) 
 
(-14.76) (-7.61) (-6.48) 
 
(-2.30) (-0.06) (0.18) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 
 
0.172*** 0.170*** 0.172*** 
 
0.129*** 0.129*** 0.130*** 
 
0.190*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 
  
(7.15) (7.12) (7.17) 
 
(4.33) (4.37) (4.40) 
 
(4.97) (4.81) (4.82) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 
 
-0.014 -0.021 -0.022 
 
-0.034 -0.035 -0.036 
 
-0.053 -0.055 -0.056 
  
(-0.48) (-0.71) (-0.77) 
 
(-0.98) (-1.02) (-1.06) 
 
(-1.14) (-1.21) (-1.22) 
N 
 
16,755 16,755 16,755 
 
4,077 4,077 4,077 
 
12,678 12,678 12,678 
Adjusted 𝑅2 
 
0.249 0.260 0.261 
 
0.287 0.292 0.292 
 
0.247 0.258 0.259 
             Notes: Table 6 presents OLS estimation results for equation (3) which intends to explore the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on prices lead earnings relation. We also estimate 
the equation (1) on two sub-samples: loss and profit firms. To capture the impact of IFRS adoption on prices lead earnings relation we added the variable ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 
(∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆) which takes value for mandatory adopters in the post-adoption period and that corresponds to the change in earnings before extraordinary items from years 
t+1 and t scaled by market-value (book-equity) at the end of year t. All others variables are defined as in Table 5. 
The equation (3) was first run with a dummy variable for each year from 1999 to 2011; we then added one dummy variable for each country in analysis and finally we added 
industry dummy variables constructed for each Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). We use White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity in 
the data. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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results reported in Table 5, that is, there is evidence of a prices lead earnings relation, and 
being it stronger for profit firms than for loss firms. 
Regarding to the coefficient which captures the impact of IFRS adoption on 
predictability of future earnings changes, namely ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 it is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level both for full sample and both loss and profit firms (-
0.170; -0.187; -0.230), which suggests that stock returns of mandatory IFRS adopters 
experience a significant reduction in the ability to anticipate future earnings changes. In line 
with earnings predictability, this negative effect is also stronger for profit firms than for loss 
firms. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of our regression in equation (3) but using 
book-equity as deflator. The coefficient of ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 obtained in the regression using 
dummy variables for year, country and industry also remains positive and significantly at 
1% for full sample and both loss and profit firms (0.172; 0.130; 0.184). Once again, there is 
evidence that earnings changes are explained by share price returns. 
However, the coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 is statistically insignificant for full 
sample and both loss and profit firms, which indicates that IFRS adoption has no significant 
impact on the prices lead earnings relation when earnings changes are scaled by book-
equity.  
In sum, the results of Table 6 suggest that stock returns of mandatory IFRS 
adopters experience a significant reduction in the ability to anticipate future earnings 
changes. Moreover, this reduction is more pronounced in profit firms.  
Finally, when earnings changes are scaled by book-equity, we do not capture 
significant impact of IFRS adoption in the prices lead earnings relation. These results were 
expected since, as indicated in section 5.1, the correlation coefficient between 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  and 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 is higher than between 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  and ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸. Thus, in the remaining 
analysis, we only discuss results using the market-value as deflator. Nevertheless, the results 
of regressions using book-equity as deflator are reported in Appendix C. 
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5.3. Country-level characteristics 
 
One concern regarding our results obtained in Table 6 is that they may be 
conditioned by changes in both economic and market environments and by certain country-
level characteristics. In fact, prior literature is consistent to infer that the quality of financial 
reporting is dependent on enforcement mechanisms and country-level factors (Ball 2006, 
Christensen et al. 2013, Preiato et al. 2015). 
We, therefore, explore whether the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the 
prices lead earnings relation is conditioned by the following five sets of control variables: (i) 
economic development; (ii) stock market development; (iii) cultural features; (iv) investor 
protection and (v) ownership structure. We provide separate analyses with reference to these 
groups of control variables in order to avoid multicollinearity problems. Table 7 presents the 
results of our OLS regression of the equation (4). 
The results in Table 7 suggest the following. First, the coefficient estimated on 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡 . 𝑀𝑉 remains positive and statistically significant at 1% level, regardless of the 
control variables studied, which supports the prices lead earnings relation. In terms of 
magnitude of coefficients, there is no great variation and they are in line with the results of 
Table 6, even when we run the equation (4) with all control variables. 
 Second, the coefficient estimated on ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆, which captures the 
impact of IFRS adoption on the prices lead earnings relation, remains negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level regardless of the control variables studied. Thus, the 
introduction of different control variables does not remove any explanatory power from the 
variable of interest, namely, ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆. Even when we run the equation (4) with 
all groups of control variables, the results remain robust and, therefore, the country-level 
characteristics do not explain the significant reduction in the ability of stock returns to 
anticipate future earnings changes. 
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Table 7 - Country-level characteristics 
             
Variable 
Economic 
Development  
Stock Market 
Development 
Cultural Variables Investor Protection  Ownership Structure All Variables 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -0.329** (-2.16) -0.148*** (-7.59) -0.278*** (-7.54) -0.169*** (-4.94) -0.127*** (-7.89) 1.328*** (5.19) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 0.438*** (11.04) 0.438*** (11.04) 0.437*** (11.04) 0.436*** (10.99) 0.438*** (11.05) 0.434*** (10.99) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 -0.173*** (-3.58) -0.168*** (-3.46) -0.172*** (-3.56) -0.168*** (-3.47) -0.166*** (-3.42) -0.176*** (-3.67) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡+1 0.019 (1.31)         
-0.175*** (-6.84) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡+1 1.344*** (6.25)         
0.580** (2.53) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡+1   
0.059*** (5.10) 
      
-0.027* (-1.77) 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+1   
0.022*** (2.66) 
      
0.004 (0.40) 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡+1   
-0.022** (-2.16) 
      
-0.033*** (-2.77) 
𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑡+1     
0.234*** (7.00) 
    
0.349*** (7.88) 
𝑈𝐴𝑉𝑡+1      
-0.003 (-0.14) 
    
-0.014 (-0.44) 
𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡+1       
0.047*** (4.50) 
  
0.115*** (6.89) 
𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑡+1       
0.006 (1.12) 
  
0.008 (1.20) 
𝐶𝑅𝑡+1       
-0.005 (-1.28) 
  
-0.007 (-1.35) 
𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑡+1       
-0.038** (-2.26) 
  
0.002 (0.12) 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑡+1         
0.030** (2.23) 0.046*** (3.25) 
         N 16,755 16,755 16,755 16,755 16,755 16,755 
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.267 0.267 0.269 0.268 0.265 0.275 
      
 
Notes: Table 7 presents OLS estimation results for equation (4) which intends to explore whether the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on prices lead earnings relation is 
conditioned by the following control variables: Log_GDPC (Log GDP per capita); GDPG (GDP growth rate); SIZE (Market capitalization); TURN (Total value of stock traded 
to the average market capitalization); CREDIT (Domestic credit to private sector by banks); IDV (Individualism index); UAV (Uncertainty avoidance index); ROL (Rule of 
law index); ADR (Anti-director rights index); CR (Credit rights index); Legal (Legal system) and OWNER (Ownership concentration). All others variables are defined as in 
Table 5 and Table 6. We run the equation (4) by each set of explanatory variables using dummy variables to control for year- and industry-specific effects. We use White 
(1980) robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity in the data. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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5.4. Additional Analysis  
 
5.4.1. Legal Origin Analysis 
 
In the country-level analysis we seek to control the effect of different legal systems 
present in our sample countries through the variable Legal, which has taken value 1 for 
code-law countries and 0 for common-law countries. In addition, legal scholars typically 
classify the code-law system into three common families, namely French, German and 
Scandinavian code, while the common-law includes the English law (La Porta et al. 1998). 
In addition, La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that common-law countries have the best 
shareholder protection and a high level of legal enforcement, while French code-law 
countries have the worst shareholder protection and the lowest level of legal enforcement. 
In our literature review some studies explore the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption 
across different legal origins (Wang et al. 2008, Houqe et al. 2014). Following prior studies, 
we examine the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the prices lead earnings relation 
across different legal origins. We regress the equation (3) but using only dummy variables 
for year- and industry-specific effects. The results are presented in Table 8. 
 
 Table 8 - Earnings predictability across legal origin  
 
     
 
 Variable English French German Scandinavian  
 Intercept 0.159*** -0.178*** -0.123** -0.204***  
 
 
(3.57) (-8.85) (-2.46)  (-7.90)  
 ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 0.492*** 0.458*** 0.506*** 0.272***  
 
 
(6.33) (7.59) (5.11)  (3.51)  
 ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 -0.152 -0.268*** -0.168 0.016  
 
 
(-1.45) (-3.77) (-1.31)  (0.17)  
 
     
 
 N 4,034 7,492 1,525 3,704  
 Adjusted 𝑅2 0.174 0.310 0.364 0.330  
 
     
 
Notes: Table 8 presents results of examining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the prices lead earnings 
relation across different legal origins. We classify our sample countries based on legal origin: English legal origin 
(U.K. and Ireland), French legal origin (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), German 
legal origin (Germany, Switzerland and Poland) and Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden). The dependent and Independent variables are defined as in Table 5 and Table 6. We run OLS regression of 
equation (3) on four different legal origin subsample, using dummy variables for year- and industry-specific effects. 
We use White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity in the data. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 8 shows that the coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level across all legal origins, which supports the prices lead earnings 
relation. Interestingly, the coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level only for countries based on French code-law. This finding suggest 
that the significant reduction in the ability of stock returns to anticipate future earnings 
changes following IFRS adoption is more pronounced in these countries. Moreover, taking 
into account the empirical findings of La Porta et al. (1998), this negative impact of IFRS 
adoption on the prices lead earnings relation seems to be associated with countries with low 
shareholder protection and low level of legal enforcement.  
 
5.4.2. Size-sorted portfolios 
 
Prior studies suggest a positive relation between firm size and the prices lead 
earnings relation, that is, stock returns of large firms have greater ability to anticipate future 
earnings changes than small firms (Collins et al. 1987, Freeman 1987, Sadka and Sadka 
2009). 
Following prior studies, we explore the joint outcome of firm size variable and 
mandatory IFRS adoption on the prices lead earnings relation. To explore this relation, we 
sort the firms of our sample into size portfolios (each year), where size is defined as the 
market-value at time t+1. Four groups of portfolios are constructed with quartile-size 1 
comprising the smallest size firms and the quartile-size 4 comprising the largest size firms. 
For each portfolio, we run the equation (3). The results are presented in Table 9. 
 
 Table 9 - Earnings predictability on size-sorted portfolios  
 Variable Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4  
 Intercept -0.106*** -0.065* -0.001 0.011  
 
 
(-2.92) (-1.84) (-0.02) (0.26)  
 ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 0.365*** 0.489*** 0.646*** 0.519*** 
 
 
 
(7.23) (6.31) (5.66) (3.93)  
 ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 -0.157*** -0.182* -0.246* -0.157  
 
 
(-2.61) (-1.90) (-1.72) (-0.96)  
        N 4,195 4,185 4,190 4,185  
 Adjusted 𝑅2 0.244 0.289 0.325 0.317  
       Notes: Table 9 presents results of examining the joint outcome of firm size variable and mandatory IFRS adoption on the 
prices lead earnings relation. We sort our sample into four size portfolios where size is defined as the market-value at time t. 
The Portfolio 1 comprises the smallest size firms while the Portfolio 4 comprises the largest size firms. The dependent and 
Independent variables are defined as in Table 5 and Table 6. The run OLS regression of equation (3) with dummy variables 
for year-, country- and industry-specific effects. We use White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for possible 
heteroskedasticity in the data. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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As can be seen in Table 9, the coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level for all portfolios which supports the prices lead earnings relation. 
However, Collins et al. (1987); Freeman (1987) and Sadka and Sadka (2009) suggest that 
earnings predictability increases as the average size of firms increase which is not totally 
supported by our results since from Portfolio 3 to Portfolio 4 we have a decrease in the 
magnitude of correlation coefficient estimated on ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉. Even so, there is some 
evidence that stock returns of large firms convey more information about the future earnings 
changes than those of small firms. 
The coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 is negative and statistically significant at least 
10% level for the first three portfolios while in the fourth portfolio the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. Focusing on the first three portfolios, the results suggest that stock 
returns of mandatory IFRS adopters exhibit a significant reduction in the ability to anticipate 
future earnings changes, and that this reduction increases as the average size of firms 
increase. About the fourth portfolio, it is not possible to infer any conclusion. 
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6. Sensitivity analysis 
 
Our findings presented over the section 5 may be affected by two methodological 
issues, namely, the fiscal year-end restriction and the identification of IFRS adopters.  
Regarding to the fiscal year-end restriction, we imposed that only firms with a 
fiscal year-end between December 31
st
 and April 30
th
 were to be included in the sample, 
since great portion of U.K. firms have a reporting period different than the calendar year. To 
understand whether this methodological choice influences our results, we restrict the sample 
to firms with a fiscal year ending in December 31
st
. Consequently, this change has impact in 
the sample composition at country-level, that is, France becomes the country with higher 
number of firms, followed by United Kingdom. Note that the remaining restrictions were 
maintained.  
As reported in Panel A of Table 10, the results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported with a fiscal year-end between December 31
st
 and April 30
th
 (see Panel A of Table 
6). The coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for the full sample and for both loss and profit firms, which support the prices lead 
earnings relation. In turn, the coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level for the full sample and for both loss and profit firms which 
reinforce the evidence that stock returns of mandatory IFRS adopters exhibit a significant 
reduction in the ability to anticipate future earnings changes. We conclude that our fiscal 
year-end restriction has no impact on the results. 
Regarding to the identification of IFRS adopters, this information was obtained 
through Worldscope field 07536, Accounting standards followed, which identifies 23 
different accounting standards followed by firms. Several studies follow the coding of 
Worldscope database both for adopters and non-adopters of IFRS and, therefore, the 
companies which adopted IFRS partially were also considered as IFRS adopters (Daske et 
al. 2013, Wu and Zhang 2009, Tan et al. 2011, Landsman et al. 2012, Bozos et al. 2014). In 
turn, in our study, we consider these firms which adopted IFRS partially as non-adopters, as 
shown in other studies (Barth et al. 2012, Kim et al. 2014). 
Thus, to explore whether our results are driven by these different approaches, we 
consider the simplest approach, that is, we only consider as IFRS adopters the firms which 
follow “International Standards” and/or “IFRS” (the Worldscope field 07536 = 02 or 23, 
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respectively) and as IFRS non-adopters the firms which follow “Local Standards” (the 
Worldscope field 07536 = 01). Panel B of Table 10 reports the results using this reduced 
sample. The coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 remains positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level while ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 remains negative and statistically significant (at least 
5%) for the full sample and for both profit and loss firms, which is consistent with the 
results reported in Panel B of Table 6. Thus, our results are not influenced by the approach 
chosen to identify IFRS adopters. 
Finally, the implementation of the IFRS in Europe gained further controversy after 
the financial crisis. Some academic researchers have focused on the role of the IFRS 
adoption in the financial crisis, that is, whether it contributed or not to what happened. The 
financial crisis led to greater volatility both in stock returns and accounting earnings, which 
may affect the ability of stock returns to anticipate future earnings changes. In order to 
examine potential problems arising from financial crisis, we excluded the firm-years 
observations from 2007 and 2008 (beyond the IFRS adoption year of 2005). As reported in 
Panel C of Table 10, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Panel A of 
Table 6. The coefficient ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 remains negative and statistically significant 
(at least 5%) for the full sample and for both profit and loss firms. Thus, it does not seem 
that the financial crisis has influence on the impact of IFRS adoption in the ability of stock 
returns to anticipate future earnings changes. 
 
  
 
 
46 
 
Table 10 - Sensitivity analysis 
  
Earnings Predictability in Full Sample 
 
Earnings Predictability in Loss Firms 
 
Earnings Predictability in Profit Firms 
  
  Year and 
Country 
Year, 
Country and 
Industry 
 
  Year and 
Country 
Year, 
Country and 
Industry 
 
  Year and 
Country 
Year, Country 
and Industry Variable 
 
Year 
 
Year 
 
Year 
                          Panel A: Fiscal year-end at December                   
Intercept 
 
-0.143*** -0.080*** -0.113*** 
 
-0.303*** -0.193*** -0.223*** 
 
-0.086*** -0.047*** -0.052** 
  
(-15.76) (-5.78) (-6.00) 
 
(-16.02) (-5.70) (-5.45) 
 
(-9.22) (-3.29) (-2.49) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 
 
0.450*** 0.441*** 0.443*** 
 
0.325*** 0.323*** 0.326*** 
 
0.577*** 0.552*** 0.550*** 
  
(10.83) (10.74) (10.76) 
 
(6.40) (6.48) (6.53) 
 
(8.78) (8.50) (8.45) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 
 
-0.219*** -0.223*** -0.223*** 
 
-0.264*** -0.269*** -0.272*** 
 
-0.242*** -0.226*** -0.222*** 
  
(-4.33) (-4.48) (-4.49) 
 
(-4.55) (-4.71) (-4.77) 
 
(-2.80) (-2.67) (-2.62) 
N 
 
14,574 14,574 14,574 
 
3,574 3,574 3,574 
 
11,000 11,000 11,000 
Adjusted 𝑅2   0.328 0.341 0.342  0.368 0.374 0.374  0.333 0.345 0.346 
Panel B: Only "WS 01 - Local Standards" code as Local Standards 
Adoption 
                
Intercept 
 
-0.085*** -0.048*** -0.076*** 
 
-0.278*** -0.228*** -0.242*** 
 
-0.016 0.006 0.005 
  
(-7.06) (-3.24) (-3.70) 
 
(-12.29) (-7.07) (-6.02) 
 
(-1.21) (0.37) (0.21) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 
 
0.424*** 0.416*** 0.417*** 
 
0.267*** 0.267*** 0.271*** 
 
0.633*** 0.607*** 0.603*** 
  
(9.06) (8.99) (9.03) 
 
(4.77) (4.82) (4.86) 
 
(8.56) (8.33) (8.25) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 
 
-0.151*** -0.157*** -0.159*** 
 
-0.146** -0.151** -0.155** 
 
-0.287*** -0.272*** -0.267*** 
  
(-2.68) (-2.84) (-2.86) 
 
(-2.24) (-2.35) (-2.41) 
 
(-2.99) (-2.90) (-2.85) 
N 
 
12,964 12,964 12,964 
 
3,270 3,270 3,270 
 
9,694 9,694 9,694 
Adjusted 𝑅2   0.246 0.258 0.259   0.285 0.289 0.289   0.250 0.261 0.262 
Panel C: Purge the Effect of the Financial  Crisis 
  
  
                
Intercept 
 
-0.095*** -0.069*** -0.094*** 
 
-0.283*** -0.213*** -0.233*** 
 
-0.032*** -0.027* -0.015 
  
(-9.45) (-4.80) (-4.53) 
 
(-14.52) (-6.57) (-5.67) 
 
(-2.96) (-1.72) (-0.61) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 
 
0.436*** 0.426*** 0.428*** 
 
0.291*** 0.290*** 0.294*** 
 
0.605*** 0.577*** 0.573*** 
  
(11.02) (10.88) (10.93) 
 
(6.05) (6.11) (6.16) 
 
(9.66) (9.31) (9.25) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 
 
-0.162*** -0.168*** -0.170*** 
 
-0.184*** -0.191*** -0.195*** 
 
-0.230*** -0.212** -0.207** 
  
(-3.14) (-3.33) (-3.37) 
 
(-3.10) (-3.28) (-3.33) 
 
(-2.60) (-2.47) (-2.41) 
N 
 
13,422 13,422 13,422 
 
3,339 3,339 3,339 
 
10,083 10,083 10,083 
Adjusted 𝑅2   0.194 0.210 0.211   0.257 0.264 0.264   0.181 0.198 0.199 
Notes: Table 10 reports the results for the sensitivity analysis. Panel A presents results of OLS regression of equation (3) but restricted to those firms with December fiscal 
year-end. Panel B presents results of OLS regression of equation (3) but assuming as IFRS adopters the firms which follow the Worldscope field 07536 = 02 or 23 and as 
IFRS non-adopters the firms which follow the Worldscope field 07536 = 01. Panel C presents results of OLS regression of equation (3) but excluding the firm-years 
observations from 2007 and 2008 to purge the effect of financial crisis. The dependent and Independent variables are defined as in Table 5 and Table 6. We use White 
(1980) robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity in the data. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
This study intends to explore the effects of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on the 
prices lead earnings relation. We start by examining if stock returns of European firms are 
able to anticipate future earnings changes since there is little evidence for Europe on this 
issue. Consistent with U.S. findings (Beaver et al. 1980, Kothari and Sloan 1992, Sadka and 
Sadka 2009), we provide evidence of the prices lead earnings relation for Europe and, 
therefore, stock returns of European firms have predictive power about future firm’s 
earnings. We also find that this predictive power is stronger for profit firms than for loss 
firms which is consistent with the results of Hayn (1995) who suggests that losses are less 
informative than profits about future cash-flows. 
Second, and being our main research question, we explore the impact of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on the prices lead earnings relation. Our results suggest that stock returns of 
mandatory IFRS adopters experience a significant reduction in the ability to anticipate future 
earnings changes, being this negative effect stronger for profits firms than for loss firms.  
Third, we examine whether the change verified on the prices lead earnings relation 
is explained by country-level characteristics, namely economic development, stock market 
development, cultural aspects, investor protection or ownership concentration. Our findings 
suggest that, regardless of the control variables used, the negative impact of IFRS adoption 
on the prices lead earnings relation remains, which suggests that this smaller capacity of 
stock returns to anticipate future earnings is not driven by country-level characteristics. 
Additional analysis suggests that the negative impact of mandatory IFRS adoption 
on the prices lead earnings relation is more pronounced in countries based on a French legal 
origin, which according to La Porta et al. (1998) findings, seems to be associated with 
countries with low shareholder protection and low level of legal enforcement. Moreover, we 
also provide some evidence that this significant reduction shown above increases as the 
average size of firms increase. 
Our results suggest that the relation between earnings changes and stock returns 
weakened following IFRS adoption, which seems to contradict the results of Barth et al. 
(2008). Barth et al. (2008) find that firms applying IAS have higher association between 
accounting measures and stock returns than firms that do not, interpreting these results as 
signal of higher quality accounting. In turn, Paananen and Lin (2009) and Zeghal et al. 
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(2012) find lower association between accounting data and stock returns following IFRS 
adoption. Although our results are consistent with the latter view, it is not correct to infer 
that IFRS adoption decreases the accounting quality as a whole since, as discussed in the 
literature review, there are other potential benefits underlying the IFRS adoption. 
Finally, we then performed a sensitivity analysis by (1) restricting our sample to 
firms with a fiscal year ending in December to ensure that each firm has the same sample 
period; (2) assuming as IFRS adopters the firms which follow “International Standards” 
and/or “IFRS” (the Worldscope field 07536 = 02 or 23, respectively) and as IFRS non-
adopters the firms which follow “Local Standards” (the Worldscope field 07536 = 01) and 
(3) excluding the firm-years observations from 2007 and 2008 to purge the effect of 
financial crisis. In both cases, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
previous analysis, that is, the mandatory IFRS adopters exhibit a significant reduction in the 
ability to anticipate future earnings changes, being not conditioned by methodological issues 
or affected by financial crisis. 
This study makes two main contributions to the literature. First, we extend prior 
investigations of prices leading earnings, but using data from 16 European countries. 
Second, we study the implications of mandatory IFRS adoption on the prices lead earnings 
relation, which is relevant since almost 120 countries have required or permitted the use of 
these accounting standards for financial reporting purposes. Given our findings, future 
research should concentrate on possible explanations on why stock returns of mandatory 
IFRS adoption experience a significant reduction in the ability to anticipate future earnings. 
In particular, further research would benefit from exploring the impact of earnings quality 
metrics on the prices lead earnings relation. 
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9. Appendices 
 
9.1. Appendix A 
Variable Description Sources 
GDP per capita 
(constant 2005 US$) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product (in U.S. dollars) divided 
by midyear population over the period 1999 to 2011. 
World Bank Database 
GDP growth (annual 
%) 
GDP growth is the real growth rate in the gross domestic product World Bank Database 
Market Capitalization 
(% of GDP) 
Market Capitalization (% of GDP) is the overall size of the stock 
market of each country (in U.S. dollars) as a percentage of its 
GDP. 
World Bank Database 
Stocks traded, 
turnover ratio (%) 
Turnover ratio is the ratio of the total value of stocks traded to the 
average market capitalization. 
World Bank Database 
Domestic credit to 
private sector by 
banks (% of GDP) 
Domestic credit provided by banks to private sector (% of GDP). World Bank Database 
Individualism index 
A country with high value on the individualism index indicates 
that people in that country focus on their internal attributes and 
which do not depend on others, living in individualistic 
environment. 
http://geert-hofstede.com 
Uncertainty aversion 
index 
A country with high value on indicates that people in that country 
do not feel comfortable in uncertain or unknown situations and 
therefore these people desire stability. 
http://geert-hofstede.com 
Anti-Director Rights 
Index 
Anti-director rights index is constituted by summing 1 when: (1) 
shareholders can vote by mail; (2) shareholders are not required to 
deposit their shares before to a general shareholders meeting; (3) 
minority representation on the board of directors through 
cumulative voting or proportional representation is allowed; (4) 
an oppressed minority mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call a 
special shareholders meeting is less than or equal to 10% or (6) 
when shareholders have preemptive rights than can only be 
waived by a shareholders' meeting. The index ranges from 0 to 6.  
Djankov et al. (2008) 
Credit Rights Index 
The creditor rights index is formed by adding 1 if: (1) there are 
restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a 
debtor file for reorganization; (2) if there are no “automatic stay” 
or “asset freeze” mechanisms (3) if secured creditors are the first 
to be paid as opposed to other creditors such as government or 
workers and finally (4) if the debtor does not retain administration 
of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The 
index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor 
rights). The index is time-varying and therefore the index values 
for the years 2004 to 2011 are set equal to the index values of the 
year 2003. 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Rule of law Index 
Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
World Bank Database 
(Worldwide Governance 
Indicators) 
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violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate 
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging 
from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Legal System 
Description of a country's legal system (1 if code law; 0 if 
common law) 
The World Factbook 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Ownership Concentration is computed by the number of closely 
held shares to common shares outstanding (%). 
Worldscope database 
(field 08021) 
 
9.2.  Appendix B 
 
Coding Based on Worldscope (WS) “Accounting Standards Followed” (Field 07536) 
WS Code WS Description Coding for Analyses 
We code firm-year observations as IFRS if one of the following cases applies: IFRS 
02 International standards  
06 International standards and some EU guidelines  
08 Local standards with EU and IASC guidelines  
12 International standards – inconsistency problems  
16 International standards and some EU guidelines – inconsistency problems  
18 Local standards with some IASC guidelines  
19 Local standards with OECD and IASC guidelines  
23 IFRS  
We code firm-year observations as U.S. GAAP if one of the following cases applies: U.S. GAAP 
03 U.S. standards (GAAP)  
13 U.S. standards – inconsistency problems  
20 U.S. GAAP reclassified from local standards  
We code firm-year observations as local if one of the following cases applies: Local 
01 Local standards  
04 Commonwealth countries standards  
05 EU standards  
07 Specific standards set by the group  
09 Not disclosed  
10 Local standards with some EU guidelines  
11 Local standards – inconsistency problems  
14 Commonwealth standards – inconsistency problems  
15 EEC standards – inconsistency problems  
17 Local standards with some OECD guidelines  
21 Local standards with a certain reclassification for foreign companies  
22 Other  
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9.3.  Appendix C 
Table 1 - Country-level characteristics (book-equity as deflator) 
             
Variable 
Economic 
Development  
Stock Market 
Development 
Cultural Variables Investor Protection  Ownership Structure All Variables 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -0.343** (-2.21) -0.145*** (-7.44) -0.281*** (-7.62) -0.173*** (-5.04) -0.125*** (-7.69) 1.318*** (5.04) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 0.173*** (7.19) 0.172*** (7.16) 0.172*** (7.15) 0.171*** (7.13) 0.173*** (7.19) 0.171*** (7.14) 
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 -0.020 (-0.69) -0.017 (-0.60) -0.019 (-0.65) -0.017 (-0.59) -0.016 (-0.55) -0.024 (-0.83) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡+1 0.021 (1.39)         
-0.175*** (-6.68) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡+1 1.373*** (6.38)         
0.620*** (2.72) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡+1   
0.055*** (4.67) 
      
-0.037** (-2.39) 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+1   
0.022*** (2.58) 
      
0.002 (0.15) 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡+1   
-0.019* (-1.93) 
      
-0.032*** (-2.69) 
𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑡+1      
0.240*** (7.17) 
    
0.362*** (8.11) 
𝑈𝐴𝑉𝑡+1       
-0.002 (-0.10) 
    
-0.010 (-0.32) 
𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡+1       
0.047*** (4.48) 
  
0.119*** (7.01) 
𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑡+1       
0.007 (1.29) 
  
0.010 (1.43) 
𝐶𝑅𝑡+1       
-0.005 (-1.16) 
  
-0.006 (-1.28) 
𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑡+1       
-0.036** (-2.12) 
  
0.003 (0.14) 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑡+1         
0.029** (2.14) 0.045*** (3.10) 
         
N 16,755 16,755 16,755 16,755 16,755 16,755 
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.252 0.251 0.254 0.253 0.250 0.260 
       This table presents results of OLS regression of equation (4) – using book-equity as deflator - which intends to explore whether the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on prices lead 
earnings relation is conditioned by the following control variables: Log_GDPC (Log GDP per capita); GDPG (GDP growth rate); SIZE (Market capitalization); TURN (Total value of 
stock traded to the average market capitalization); CREDIT (Domestic credit to private sector by banks); IDV (Individualism index); UAV (Uncertainty avoidance index); ROL (Rule of 
law index); ADR (Anti-director rights index); CR (Credit rights index); Legal (Legal system) and OWNER (Ownership concentration). All others variables are defined as in Table 5 and 
Table 6. We run the equation (4) by each set of explanatory variables using dummy variables to control for year- and industry-specific effects. We use White (1980) robust standard 
errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity in the data. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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 Table 2 - Earnings predictability across legal origin (book-equity as deflator) 
 
 
 
     
 
 Variable English French German Scandinavian  
 Intercept 0.176*** -0.179*** -0.108** -0.206***  
 
 
(3.88) (-8.83) (-2.07) (-7.90)  
 ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 0.156*** 0.215*** 0.204** 0.121***  
 
 
(3.80) (5.07) (2.40) (2.70)  
 ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 -0.006 -0.078 -0.092 0.052  
 
 
(-0.10) (-1.56) (-0.92) (0.93)  
 
     
 
 N 4,034 7,492 1,525 3,704  
 Adjusted 𝑅2 0.148 0.302 0.329 0.325  
 
     
 
This table presents results of examining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on prices lead earnings relation 
across different legal origins. We classify our sample countries based on legal origin: English legal origin (U.K. and 
Ireland), French legal origin (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), German legal 
origin (Germany, Switzerland and Poland) and Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). 
The dependent and Independent variables are defined as in Table 5 and Table 6. We run the OLS regression of 
equation (3) on four different legal origin subsample, using dummy variables for year- and industry-specific effects. 
We use White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity in the data. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 - Earnings predictability on size-sorted portfolios (book-equity as deflator) 
 
 
 Variable Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4  
 Intercept -0.103*** -0.066* 0.001 0.009  
 
 
(-2.82) (-1.84) (0.02) (0.22)  
 ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 0.095*** 0.245*** 0.272*** 0.181*** 
 
 
 
(3.13) (4.86) (4.25) (2.92)  
 ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡+1_𝐵𝐸 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 0.023 -0.123** -0.071 0.083  
 
 
(0.62) (-2.02) (-0.83) (1.16)  
        N 4,195 4,185 4,190 4,185  
 Adjusted 𝑅2 0.215 0.272 0.312 0.313  
       This table presents results of examining the joint outcome of firm size variable and mandatory IFRS adoption on prices 
lead earnings relation. We sort our sample into four size portfolios where size is defined as the market-value at time t. 
The Portfolio 1 comprises the smallest size firms while the Portfolio 4 comprises the largest size firms. The dependent 
and Independent variables are defined as in Table 5 and Table 6. We run the OLS regression of equation (3) with 
dummy variables for year-, country- and industry-specific effects. We use White (1980) robust standard errors to 
correct for possible heteroskedasticity in the data. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. 
 
 
